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Connections (US) 2017

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Matt Caffrey and Tim Wilkie have sent around the following announcement regarding the forthcoming Connections (US) interdisciplinary wargaming conference:

Colleagues,

Please save 1-4 August to participate in Connections US 2017, at Quantico Marine Corps Base (MCB), VA.  Please ensure your boss and colleagues who cannot participate in person reserve the morning of Friday, 4 August to connect to our out brief.

Connections is a free, annual, interdisciplinary, wargame conference.  Connections purpose is to bring together practitioners of wargaming from the military, government, defense industry, commercial, and academic communities to advance and sustain the art, science, and application of wargaming.  Each year it is hosted by a different DoD organizations, such as Air University and the National Defense University.  This year’s Connections will be hosted by the Marine Corp Combat Development Center.  Our theme for 2017 is advancing wargaming and analysis as distinct yet complimentary tools.

Day 0 of Connections (Tuesday, 1 August) will include a spectrum of seminars on the morning, with some appropriate to those new to the field and others of value to masters of the craft.  In the afternoon there will be large wargames allowing all to apply what they learned in the morning.

Day 1 will include our keynote speaker, speaker panels on each wargaming community (defense, commercial and academic) and will conclude with a set of Game Labs, again with options appropriate to every experience level.

Day 2 will include a panel on emerging wargame applications and three working groups on; wargaming and analysis, wargame education and wargaming and innovation.

Day 3 will consist of out briefs on the findings of the entire conference.  Remote participation is encouraged.

Again, mark 1-4 August on your calendar and plan to join us at Connections US.

For more information contact us or simply go to our web site at Connections-wargaming.com.

See you at Connections,

Matt Caffrey
Tim Wilkie

Co-Chairs
Connections US 2017

 

MORS wargaming AAR

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On 17-20 October 2016 the Military Operations Research Society held a special meeting on wargaming. PAXsims’ very own Tom Mouat was there both to help facilitate the event and to bring us the report below.

Additional details from regular PAXsims reader Paul Vebber follow after Tom’s report.


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I was privileged to be invited, along with colleagues from the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), to the MORS Wargaming Special Meeting on 17 to 21 October 2016 in Alexandria, VA. Rex couldn’t make it, so again I was deputised to provide PAXSims readers with a report.

It was clear in the lead-up to the event that this was to be a more in-depth look at a few things, rather than the usual conference offering of a shallow look at a large number of things. This was unusual and I’m not entirely sure that it provided the best fit for the stated aims for the workshop:

  • How best incorporate rigorous and well-designed wargaming into the department’s larger analytical and acquisition focus.
  • As the demand for wargaming continues to grow we need to increase the pool of wargamers and wargame designers to meet those needs now and into the future.

If you were a beginner, unsure as to the role and range of wargame tools and techniques, you might have got lucky in choosing the workshop sessions that met your requirements; but if you weren’t it is perfectly possible you would get stuck in a session unsuitable for your needs. This wasn’t helped by the descriptions issued prior to the event being a little less than clear and a number of session being classified and NOFORN (no foreigners). This was exacerbated when there were a number of last minute changes to programme aims, the sessions and their classification.

I had originally intended to look at a number of the sessions and provide assistance to the “Project Cassandra, Envisioning Possible Futures” session. However one of the wargaming sessions (when I say “sessions” it was actually four half-day sessions spread over three days) had the organisation running it (US Army Training and Doctrine Command/TRADOC pull out. I was invited to stand in and run the session on matrix gaming instead—which I was delighted to do.

Travel and subsistence budgets being what they are, the cheapest flights from the UK are on a Saturday, giving us the bonus of recovering from jetlag as well as the opportunity to do some additional professional development in visiting the battlefield of Gettysburg. This is a quite outstanding battlefield, well preserved and with an excellent visitor centre. There are a large number of different lessons that can be gained from looking at details of the large battle, over the two days of the fighting. The Dstl staff, led by their own historian, took advantage of this. Sadly I was unable to participate as I was doing last minute preparation for the sessions.

The hotel recommended for the event was excellent and ideally placed for the subsequent events which were held in the hotel and at the nearby Institute for Defence Analysis (IDA).

Monday, 17 October 2016

The first day included a course, “Wargaming Introduction and Theory,” run by Dr Peter Perla and Dr Ed McGrady, which lasted all day. In addition, a shorter course, “Executive Overview of Military Wargaming,”  was run by Mike Garrambone. I attended the first of these because the UK Defence Academy is intending to run its own “Introduction to Wargaming” course, and watching how two of the foremost experts in the field do it was likely to be extremely educational.

Peter Perla started and covered wargaming history, from the earliest games and models used for training and education, through to the birth of modern wargaming. This included Kriegsspiel, Johann Hellwig’s wargame, the introduction of geomorphic maps, real topographic mapping and the use of experienced umpires in order to reduce complexity and include military common sense. He also covered the rise of the hobby game, sparked off by H G Wells’ Little Wars; the crossover from RAND’s use of hexagons to regularise movement; and the game company Avalon Hill and its success in publishing games for the hobby market.

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Peter Perla reviews the evolution of wargaming.

The course went on to cover the rise of wargaming as a fundamental part of the analytical process in the inter-war years, particularly in the US Navy War College. This is probably one of the most innovative periods of concept and doctrine development which helped shape the conflict to come, not just in the USA but also among the German General Staff.

I noted that from this period that there were two observations that emerged from these wargames:

  • Some people are dicks.
  • Innovation takes time.

Some of the participants in the wargaming process are unable to see the value of exploring a situation or problem through a game, fail to take it seriously and behave inappropriately. This is not helpful, but wargame facilitators need to be aware of this, and develop mitigating strategies to deal with it or valuable opportunities will be lost. (I would also offer that this phenomenon is not limited to manual wargaming – computer simulation is also afflicted with personnel who seem unable to grasp what the process is trying to achieve and are negative or disruptive, however well run the game.)

Innovation is not a simple process with a short timescale. It takes time to breed the open minded and intelligent organisational culture where ideas are valued from wherever they arise and where change is embraced. It is only from this basis that sustained advances can be generated and genuine advantage realised.

We then moved on to Dr Ed McGrady who covered the theory of games, how they work, what approaches work best and the human response to games. He started with a warning that, while efforts are improving, there is still no proper epistemology of wargaming and no coherent theoretical treatment—especially of manual games although there is a reasonable amount of work dealing with computer games.

Diversity in this area is a challenge and there is no simple one definition to cover all wargames.

He went on to cover the elements that make up a game, wargames vs peace games, what is not a wargame and some of the foundations of the concept of “play.” In many professional and analytical games the designers seem to want to eliminate the “play” aspects of the wargame. This is wrong, fails to get buy-in to the process, followed by a lack of understanding of the problem space and ultimately results in a bad game.He covered the elements of play, the role of making them enjoyable in a defence analytical context, their internal structure and most importantly the psychological and neurological concept of narrative (leading to engagement, and the “entre deux”, the in-between space where disbelief is suspended and insights are gained).

This included the significant observation: Lunch is important! If you are going to the time and effort in order to involve the participants in a game, where future possibilities are envisaged, disbelief suspended, and the players fully engaged, it is foolhardy to jeopardise the event by refusing to provide lunch—forcing participants to disperse, lose the game immersion and focus, and ultimately much of the value of the process.

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Some of my notes from “Wargaming: Theory and Introduction.”

I have made many pages of notes, including the dramaturgical aspects of games, the concept of “flow”, games vs simulations, hard vs soft assumptions, the big questions about the effect games have, sociological work, and theoretical principles. Indeed, it was all much too much to be able to present a coherent commentary here without significant additional thought and the risk of boring you!

Which brings me to a concern. This was not really an introduction to wargaming. Instead, it was a masterclass in the theoretical underpinnings of the art, that included some really deep stuff. I found the day incredibly useful (and I am anxiously awaiting copies of the slides because I’m afraid that my hurried notes may well have missed something), but I am also a wargaming practitioner of many years, including running and designing games used by defence as well as the wider community. I suspect that a novice, seeking an initial understanding, might well become lost and confused…

…until they decided to demonstrate what they meant, by the use of the matrix game “Lasgah Pol” dealing with peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan (available as part of Matrix Games for Modern Wargaming). Since I designed the game , and was asked to demonstrate an example move, they are obviously geniuses!.

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Tuesday, 18 October 2016

This was the start of the special event proper, and followed the more usual format of a plenary keynote and panel sessions until shortly after lunch.

Following introductions and the US national anthem, we started with a keynote from Andrew Marshall, former advisor to the Secretary of Defence for Net Assessment. At first glance it looked like the organisers were rolling out someone from an earlier era, but he quickly contradicted that impression, demonstrating sharp and timely insight. He gave a brief history of the Office of Net Assessment and pointed out that reading long papers on a subject can take time and are likely to only explore the subject from a single point of view. Games, in contrast, were very quick at distilling issues to their essential fundamentals, but he also underlined the importance of a proper opposition (the Red players).

An example he gave was dealing with the Strategic Bomber programme. This was during the Cold War—strategic bombers were expensive compared to ballistic missiles, and there were calls to make cuts in the bomber fleet. Looking at the problems through a series of wargames demonstrated that the bomber fleet forced the enemy to invest in large quantities of air defence weapons. Since the enemy was resource limited, this was advantageous to the US. On the other hand, cutting the bomber fleet would permit an enemy to switch in investment from weapon systems that were essentially of limited use, to areas that would present more of a threat. This lead to the conclusion that when thinking about a subject it is often essential to look widely at the problem to ensure a holistic solution

Marshall also pointed out, from his vast experience, that if you want innovation you should select the best players and if you want good games you should use the best facilitators. Choose the best for the most important problems.

This was followed by the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group (DWAG) Quad Chair panel. This covered the initiative resulting from DEPSECDEF Robert Work’s February 2015 memo to institute a repository for wargames and their reports. It currently includes some 550 high level games on a wide range of topics, as well as including funding for additional games and wargaming projects (including funding the US DOD and foreign government attendance at the MORS event). They issue a monthly report including a listing of upcoming games, highlighting previous games that are in the depository, the usual statistics about the depository, and other areas about DOD wargaming.

I was initially very cynical about the value of such a depository, but it appears to have access at the highest levels and is being managed effectively. I was particularly impressed by the definite focus on innovation, increasing the decision space for the leadership, and the particular emphasis on “so what?”—that is, proper explanation of the value of the work done and links to real change. Of course, the repository is a US-only classified capability, but it certainly sounds useful. I’m now jealous!

The panel also covered the intriguing idea of using wargames to educate members of Congress. This was, of course, difficult, and would probably have to focus on their direct staff, but it still looks like a really good idea. They also mentioned the lack of value gained from games that generated obvious conclusions: “Don’t tell me we have a lack of a particular resource —we already know that. Tell me what you did to compensate for it and did it work!” which is, of course, intrinsically more useful.

The Services Panel followed, with a number of useful observations:

  • An understanding that putting on more, smaller sized, games helps frame specific problems.
  • Wargames and quantitative analysis are not enemies – they are complimentary, depending on each other.
  • There needs to be robust cost modelling in games – stop inventing stuff with ridiculously cheap costs.
  • Wargames help frame a problem properly for greater understanding (a recurring theme across the ages).
  • Wargaming as a discipline encourages plagiarism – get the best ideas to work for you from anywhere.

I was interested to see the Department of Homeland Security present, happy to learn from the mistakes of others and present with a sense of humour. They hope to avoid the OODA loop problem where it ends up as “Observe, Overreact, Destroy, Apologize,” instead of what it is meant to be.

The Combatant Commands were next and I was impressed at the real efforts to reinvigorate wargaming after decades of decline. It was acknowledged that the efforts were a little patchy in places, but equally there seemed to be a real appreciation of the value to be gained.

This was followed by the Allies panel, with contributions from the UK, Holland, Sweden and Canada. These showed that wargaming efforts were in place in each nation, even if at a vastly different level of effort to the USA. The UK chose to highlight the essential work of Dstl and the Connections UK conference, and Canada mentioned publishing a wargaming doctrine publication, something the UK are also working on.

Lastly we had a panel on Red Teaming from specialists in that discipline. They were initially surprised to be invited and explained the aim of Red Teaming is to get “better decisions and better plans”, through knowing oneself, mitigating group think, fostering empathy and through applied critical thinking.

Working Groups, Courses and Wargames

At this point we broke up into smaller groups to spend the rest of Tuesday, all day Wednesday and Thursday morning in our respective session. Because of this I lost sight of what else was going on, although Paul Vebber provides some additional insight at the end of this report.

The sessions were:

  • Working Group 1: Analytic Process with Paul Davis and Matt Caffrey. Classified. NOFORN.
  • Working Group 2: Communication and Implementation, with Paul Vebber.
  • Working Group 3: Adjudication, with Tim Wilkie.
  • Course 2: Red Teaming, with Steven Rotkoff.
  • Course 3: Structured Analytic Techniques, with Joseph Cyrulik.
  • Wargame 1: Project Cassandra – Envisioning Possible Futures, with Yuna Wong.
  • Wargame 2: Phase Zero Baltic Operations with Scott Simpkins. Not Classified, but NOFORN.
  • Wargame 3. Matrix Gaming, with Tom Mouat.
  • Synthesis Group: This was an oversight group with Peter Perla looking for common themes and best practices.

 

Matrix Wargaming

Since I had 4 sessions of about 4 hours each, and one of the benefits of matrix gaming is that games are quick to design and play, we did a different game in each session.

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Matrix game materials ready for play.

We started the game with a presentation on matrix wargames looking at different approaches and the value of roleplay in predicting the outcome of conflict. This was followed with “Kazhdyy Gorod” a game about a city in a former Soviet state on the border with Russia.

The game started extremely well, with everything looking on track to being sorted out with the minimum of trouble or bloodshed. Well, that was until the Chief of Police acted against orders from the Mayor, who promptly assassinated her in a scene of the finest “Godfather” tradition in front of the rest of the city council. Chaos ensued (not least for the facilitator) but soon resolved itself with the Rebels kidnapping and murdering the Mayor, the Militia Commander sitting neatly on the fence and the Protest Leader ably supported by the power of international media (in the shape of the Press player) being elected the new Mayor of the city.

I was quite shocked and wondered if anyone was going to turn up for the following session after the adjudication difficulties, but with hindsight it was a good stress test of the system and showed the participants that the game can cope with wild play.

Wednesday, 19 September 2016

The following morning began with a short presentation on my guidance tips for facilitating Matrix Games, followed by the Cyber game “All Your Secrets Are Belong To Us“, a game about stealing the next generation stealth fighter plans.

This game went extremely well with very good participation all around and it was quite rewarding to see that the flow of the narrative was appreciated by the players. This meant the consequential requirement of detailed formal adjudication was much reduced, now that the players were more familiar with the game and gameplay.

That afternoon, after another short presentation, this time on some facilitator techniques that could be helpful for facilitators, we decided to design and run a complete matrix game on a subject chosen by the participants within the time available.

Baltic Challenge

The subject chosen was the current crisis in the Baltic States, especially as we had a Swedish and Dutch participant in the group. The game was entitled “Baltic Challenge” and the game design followed the following steps:

  • Define the game scope: modelling the current crisis in the Baltic States.
  • Define the “Actors” involved in the crisis and the order of play.
  • Define the Objectives for the Actors (simple bullet point objectives).
  • Design possible “triggers” as pre-conditions to possibly upset the current equilibrium.
  • Generate a suitable visualisation (map) for the area.
  • Allocate markers representing effects in the game (DIME/PMESII/FRIS).

We had a long discussion about who to represent as players (required to influence the game) as opposed to being mainly there to be influenced by others. In the end, we chose the following “Actors”:

  • Russian separatists in the Baltic States.
  • The Baltic State Governments as a single actor:
    • Estonia
    • Latvia
    • Lithuania
  • Poland as a separate actor.
  • The USA as a separate actor.
  • The Nordic States as a single actor:
    • Sweden
    • Finland
  • NATO

We generated the objectives for each party quickly and then commenced play. A number of possible “triggers” were also discussed:

  • Iskander deployment to Kaliningrad.
  • Russian troop movements on the border.
  • An economic report demonstrating ethnic disadvantages for Russian speakers in the Baltic States.
  • Airspace violations.
  • Soviet fleet manoeuvres in the Baltic.
  • Soviet ship breakdown on the way to Kaliningrad (assumed Iskander missiles and S-400 air defences on board).

The preferred option was a mix of an economic report indicating Russian speakers have a justified grievance and the Soviet resupply ship breaking down off Tallinn on the Estonian coast.

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A later version of the “Baltic Challenge” map.

The game worked very well, highlighting a large number of points to the participants that they were unaware of. The chief insights from the game were that the Baltic States may well try to “do the right thing” for the Russian speaking minority, but they were largely pawns in the game between Russia and the West. There were a number of treaties that affected the participants (the 1997 Founding Act, EU sanctions against Russia, and NATO relations with Sweden) that were important and needed to be understood. The fact that Poland has a right-wing government keen to demonstrate that it will not be bullied by Russia might not necessarily be a good thing as NATO depended on Poland to play a key role in the area and felt limited in the sort of pressure it could bring to bear.

It was also noted that the Inkander missiles, with a range of 500km, may violate the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty (missiles with a range of 500-5,500km) and there was speculation as to why the USA or NATO governments have not challenged Russia about them. The following morning, this was the subject of a Wall Street Journal article, neatly showing the game was on the right track highlighting this issue.

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Gaming the headlines!

We felt that the game would have benefitted (as would any game) from a specialist subject matter expert in the region to assist the facilitator with the briefings, objectives, consequence management, and adjudication but nevertheless we felt that three hours of work had demonstrated the value of the game and wider regional understanding.

The game is now available via a link at PAXsims.

Thursday, 20 September 2016

On the final day, we elected to have a game run by the participants as, given the level of experience they had achieved with the game process and mechanics, they should be able to run and facilitate their own game. The game chosen was “ISIS Crisis“, with updated briefing and dispositions to reflect the current situation.

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Playing ISIS Crisis.

The pre-game discussion indicated a strong feeling that if the game was to be wider than just Iraq, it needed the involvement of Turkish and Russian actors, even at risk of slowing down play, so these roles were included.

The game ran well, even if the most up to date developments were not reflected in the initial set up. The inclusion of Russian and Turkish actors, did change the balance of the game and showed just how far things had changed in the years since the game was designed. It was felt that it would benefit from updated quality briefings for these actors to match the other briefings.

Closing Plenary Sessions

Finally, there was a closing session in which back brief were given on the different workshops, courses and wargames as well as a keynote by DEPSECDEF Robert Work.

The Deputy Secretary of Defence commenced his remarks with the inevitable senior officer’s joke and seemed, at least initially, to be a straightforward explanation of what he was trying to achieve. After a few minutes though, when he had warmed to his subject, the presentation was transformed into an inspiring call to arms that was quite different to the usual rhetoric. Having your DEPSECDEF being quite so disarmingly clear that he wakes up every day thinking of ways that he can mess up the plans of potential adversaries was a breath of fresh air from someone who clearly knows his stuff. He gets my vote and I’m not even an American.

The final thing that stuck in my mind was the realisation that we are facing a new “inter-war period” with all the implications that this brings, and that we need to develop new ways and means to give decision makers strategic choices for the future.

I am looking forward to seeing the presentations being posted on the MORS website so that I can have an understanding of what went on in the other sessions.

Friday, 21 September 2016

The following day the UK delegation (Dstl and I) visited the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at John Hopkins University in order to take a look at the work of APL and the Collaborative Analysis Centre. This was an utterly inspiring visit, generating a raft of ideas and possibilities.

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Visiting JHU APL.

The MORS event continued with additional sessions about Research Design by Dr John Compton, but sadly we were unable to attend those.

Summary

Despite the minor administration problems, mainly affecting us foreigners, the trip was extremely worthwhile. Being able to practice my craft with experienced and knowledgeable participants at this level was very valuable for my personal development and a significant contribution to the UK Defence Academy plans for the future.

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I got a shiny MORS challenge coin too!

I still have reservations as to the value for an inexperienced beginner in this subject area, given the level at which many of the instructional participants were operating. This needs to be addressed if we are to generate replacements for the increasingly old expertise we have in the field (myself included).

Tom Mouat


 

Additional Details from Paul Vebber:

I was a co-chair for a working group looking at the issues of “Communication and Implementation” and the relationship of those issues with technology. First, what information needs to move within the “game world” and between the players? Second, what information needs to move between the game world and players and the adjudicators? Third, what what information needs to move out of the “game world” to the observers and analysts?

Ed McGrady and I sliced the group of about 30 we had into subgroups a couple different ways, and discussed these issues in the context of the sort of problems they typically used wargaming techniques to explore. We then focused on two different types of games—Ed the more POL-MIL type, and I a more high tactical/ low operational—and walked through a game design exercise considering where it made sense to use technologies of different levels of sophistication in this communication focused design approach.

Interestingly the team looking at the more qualitative POL-MIL type of game went “high order” on technology to address the “inside the game world” communication issues linking large numbers of players dealing with a high degree of “interactional complexity”.

The group dealing with a more operational problem (exploring the decision space associated with maintaining a long term—many weeks to a few months—naval presence in a location where an ambiguous adversary occasionally lobs missiles at you, or potentially threatens you by other means, AND you have to deal with other emergent operational requirements nearby) started with a “low tech” representation that developed into a card-driven board game.

Despite initial thoughts that some fairly sophisticated M&S tools may be required, it turned out the tech requirements were more about communicating between the game world of manual game play and observer/analysts to capture situational information about why decisions were made and the risk calculus was assessed. The “high fidelity M&S” tools were then used in analysis efforts fed by information from the game and did not have to integrated into the gameplay directly.

This provided a simpler, quicker playing game which feeds M&S efforts focused on digging into the “structural complexity” of weapon system interaction in a well understood operational context that is emergent from and traceable to player decision making.

There were two other working groups, three opportunities to play in different types of games, and five different classes. Check the MORS website for more info on those events—I’m not sure how much of the material and outbriefs will be made available, my understanding is at least some of it will be.

Paul Vebber

Gaming foreign policy (at the FSI)

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On Monday I spent the day at the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Alexandria, VA, where the Foreign Service Institute trains State Department personnel and others.

The Institute’s programs include training for the professional development of Foreign Service administrative, consular, economic/commercial, political, and public diplomacy officers; for specialists in the fields of information management, office management, security, and medical practitioners and nurses; for Foreign Service Nationals who work at U.S. posts around the world; and for Civil Service employees of the State Department and other agencies. Ranging in length from one day to two years, courses are designed to promote successful performance in each professional assignment, to ease the adjustment to other countries and cultures, and to enhance the leadership and management capabilities of the U.S. foreign affairs community.

This is the second time in two months that I’ve had the opportunity to speak to foreign ministry personnel about the potential use of games-based methods for both training and analysis—in September, I also made a presentation at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This time I offered an overview of the why, what, and how of foreign policy simulation and gaming, and then took some of the participants through games of both AFTERSHOCK: A Humanitarian Crisis Game and the ISIS Crisis matrix game. You’ll find the slides I used in my presentation here..

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In the game of AFTERSHOCK, the score initially plunged deep into the negatives. However,  effective priority-setting and coordination during mid-game play ultimately resulted in a  very solid victory (especially for the apparently very popular government of Carana).

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The Government of Carana rushes large numbers of security personnel to District 2 to deal with mounting social unrest.

Our game of ISIS Crisis reflected the current situation, with Iraqi and Kurdish forces undertaking operations against ISIS in Mosul. These made gradual progress, but were slowed by ISIS use of chemical IEDs, a scandal over Iranian arms shipments to Iraq, and an Iraqi cabinet crisis that resulted in the return of Nouri al-Maliki to the position of Prime Minister of Iraq—much to the dismay of Iraqi Sunnis, Washington, and Tehran alike. Despite pledges that Shiite militias would not play a role in the Mosul campaign, they did so anyway—aggravating sectarian tensions. ISIS sought to organize simultaneous mass casualty attacks in the US, but the FBI managed to insert an informant among the plotters and arrested everyone involved before the attacks could be carried out. The game ended with ISIS still in Mosul, and military operations still underway. Afterwards much of the discussion focused on how best to debrief matrix games so as to best attain the desired learning outcomes.

Many thanks are due to Walker Hardy and the FSI for organizing and hosting my visit.

MORS livestream: US DEPSECDEF Robert Work on wargaming

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The Military Operations Research Society will be livestream an keynote address by US Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work to the MORS special meeting on wargaming on Thursday, October from 14:15to 15:15.

You can view the livestream here.

Robert Work’s February 2015 memo on the need to reinvigorate wargaming can be found here on PAXsims.

Duke University: “Gaming in support of the Middle East peace process” (October 20)

On October 20 I’ll be speaking at Duke University on the topic of gaming in support of the Middle East peace process. There’s not really a “Middle East peace process” any more, of course—but hopefully the gaming stuff will be interesting!

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You’ll find additional details here. Among the games I will be discussing are:

I’ll also say a little about using gaming approaches to address other Middle East conflicts, including the ISIS Crisis matrix game, the  Syrian refugees in Lebanon educational simulation (2015), and the recent Atlantic Council crisis game on US engagement in the Middle East (2016).

Workshop on history and games (Glasgow School of Art)

The Glasgow School of Art (Digital Design Studio) will be holding a workshop on history and games on 29 September 2016:

The main goal of this workshop is to give a state-of-the-art picture of Serious Games in Education, in particular in the learning domain of history, and to identify further opportunities of using digital or analogue games as a teaching tool in this domain, but also more widely. This workshop aims to reach out to various stakeholders and experts in education, game design, game development, and systems development. The format of the workshop will be: short, overview-style presentations and game demos to start with, followed by activity and discussion sessions in game design and serious mod.

This workshop is part of a longer-term effort in the development of a game engine, the JominiEngine as a practical teaching tool in the domain of history education. We hope to build a community of interested partners out of this workshop and solicit input for the further development of the engine and for the setting of priorities….

You’ll find full details here.

h/t Philip Sabin

Connections NL 2016 report

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The following report was provided for PAXsims by Hans Steensma, Bas Kreuger, Swen Stoop, and Anja van der Hulst.


 

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Defending the Netherlands.

After a marvellous Connections UK, Connections NL was also exciting and fun. For the third time we got together in a fortress of the New Dutch Water Line. This Line, together with the Amsterdam Defence Line, is a 19th century defence system with a circumference of 215 kilometre, encompassing the cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht. It protects the western part of our country, with our harbours and the seat of government. This massive system of fortifications is formed by at least 105 fortresses, 6 fortified towns and two castles. The strength of the defence is in its ability to inundate large tracts of land between fortifications. A very Dutch experience indeed.

Connections NL has a broad scope and includes members from the business community, the crisis management, and education communities. Consequently we had quite a diverse group of attendants.

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Matt Caffrey was our guest of honour and he did a great Wargaming 101 session and Q&A sessions afterwards. Mark Stoop showed more of his scenario based policy gaming for very senior leadership, we reported on the current developments in wargaming and we did a lot of hands-on gaming with our 55 attendees.

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Our students eagerly listening to Matt Caffrey discuss wargaming.

In the hands-on sessions, there was a special presentation by a team of Marine lieutenants (ex midshipmen). They told us the harrowing story behind the wargame Matruska that they created and hosted this spring at the naval academy. When they started designing this game, they had no experience at all with wargaming and within a month they created a modern crisis game that was remotely based on the Cuban crisis, with a total communication black-out that confronted leadership at the naval base in Den Helder with some really nasty decisions that might have had substantial political repercussions. They also showed us how perceptions can be deceiving. A good grasp of reality, sound decision making and excellent command guidance helped the players avoid ultimate disaster: going to war over a jealous husband.

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Hands-on with Matt at the TNO Game Lab.

The second day was a more intimate hands-on session at the Dutch Defence research facility of TNO. We thoroughly enjoyed playing AFTERSHOCK, Command Modern Air Naval Operations, a Port Safety and Security game under development, and the re-design of a refugee game made by Jim Wallman. The redesign effort was oriented at highlighting the influence and importance of ethics in the resolution of the refugee crisis.

Since we started with the try-out in 2014, and the real first Connections NL in 2015, the Netherlands has also been infected by the US and UK surge of enthusiasm for wargaming. We see many interesting developments within wargaming in the Netherlands. The military schools are (re) introducing wargaming and we see a fair amount of spin-off to the business community. With the education community following at a distance, games are slowly gaining traction.

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Playing AFTERSHOCK.

Next year we will again host the seminar in one of those awesome fortresses, and it will be your chance to visit and be part of them. As part of our maritime trading heritage our second native language is English. So even though Connections NL is oriented at awakening wargaming in the Netherlands, we welcome guests from abroad and make them feel welcome.

Although Connections NL is a lot smaller and less seasoned than Connections UK or US, it might still be interesting to an international audience, precisely for our trading culture, inviting participants from business, government and education as well as the military. Come over next year and help us build the broader base for the employment of wargaming.

For more information on Connections NL visit our website. Also recommended is a good report by a distinguished participant from Belgium.

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Matt’s “Wargaming 101” summarized.

Connections UK 2016 AAR

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The main conference component of the 2016 Connections UK professional wargaming conference started on Wednesday, with a record 160 participants registered—the largest Connections UK meeting to date, and the second largest Connections ever.

In the opening session Graham Longley-Brown highlighted the renewed interest in wargaming across the UK military and in the public realm. Among the many things he pointed to were the Sandhurst Kriegsspiel, the various Connections conferences, and the recent publication Zones of Control, edited by Pat Harrigan and Matthew Kirschenbaum. Having done so, however, he raised the question of how best to institutionalize wargaming and build further capacity—the question at the heart of this year’s conference. Phil Sabin echoed these points, welcomed participants on behalf of King’s College London and the Department of War Studies.

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The first panel, chaired by ED McGrady (CNA), explored the psychology of successful wargames. Graham Longley-Brown (LBS Consultancy) started off by addressing high-engagement wargames. Wargaming, he argued, was about people, the decisions they take, and the resulting story-living experience. He went on to identify the various components that can contribute to this, including the need to keep players in a game flow that avoids both boredom and excess frustration, and inside the “bubble” of narrative engagement and suspension of disbelief.

Next, Nick Hare (Aleph Insights) offered an excellent presentation on creativity in ludic decision-making. He noted that arriving at a solution involves a mix of both creative and critical (System I and System II) thinking— a cognitive process that we may not be well aware of when it is underway. “Analysis paralysis” tends to occur in the transition between initial assessment and deeper understanding. He noted that much of the literature on analysis focuses on shortcomings in critical thinking (such as failure to fully use information because of cognitive bias) rather than weaknesses in creative thinking (“failures of imagination”). He identified a number of games that encourage creative thinking (Pictionary, Dixit, Codenames, Diplomacy, A Distant Plain, D&D, Megagames). He suggested that (game system) complexity and legibility (maps, clear game concepts, theme) contribute to ludic encouragement of creative thinking.

Finally, the ever-cunning Stephen Downes-Martin (US NWC) talked about wargaming to deceive the sponsor. Wargame sponsors, he argued, often have an interest in deceptive wargames that validate preconceived notions. Wargamers therefore need to learn how to deceive sponsors as a way of inoculating wargaming against sponsor manipulation. This can be done at the game development stage to directly deceive sponsors, or deceiving players during game play in order to deceive the sponsor and other stakeholders. Stress, over-confidence, and career pressures can be exploited to directly manipulate sponsors. Loopholes can be designed into a game that players will exploit in order to generate the desired findings. Having identified how wargames can be deceptive, Stephen then moved on to ways of dealing with all this in order to safeguard game quality: game peer review; monitoring player stress; engaging the sponsor; punishing but learning from cheating; matching game flow to level of war being gamed; identifying and monitoring ambiguous game rules and procedures; and rotating game roles.

I asked about the dangers of too much creative thinking, whereby powerful narrative engagement leads players to forgo critical thinking about real-world feasibility. (This, for example, was a serious problem in my view with the Jane McGonical/World Bank EVOKE social entrepreneurship game.) Nick responded by stressing that the game model needs to root players in the plausible. Graham noted that he more often encounters the challenge of too little engagement rather than too much, but that the game controller should play a role in nudging players back to game objectives. Another questioner asked about the perennial issue of using dice in games, and the discomfort many military participants have with this. All panel members defended the integration of uncertainty through stochastic process. A member of the audience also asked about how one might deal with a situation where a sponsors insists on a scenario that is unwinnable (but isn’t intended to be).

After a coffee break, we were given a brief one minute overview of each of the many games that would be available for play during the later demonstration periods.

After lunch, we returned to discuss non-combat wargames, with the session chaired by Anja van der Hulst. Russell King started us off with an NHS emergency planning exercise. This began with a video announcing a plane crash onto the M-1 near Kegworth, Leicestershire. We were then presented with a series of challenges. Russell used this to discuss the approach he uses, which he sees as facilitated peer review rather than a game with a game control adjudicating outcomes. He noted that it can be hard to get senior people together to participate: they are busy, they are experienced, and they may view a major disaster as a remote possibility compared to day-to-day challenges. However, it is important and necessary that they prepare—indeed, in the UK, this is a professional and legal requirement. If the simulation is snappy, fun, respectful of professional expertise, and tailored to organizational needs it is easier to secure engagement.

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Russell King talks us through a brief emergency planning exercise.

Mark Stoop discussed scenario-based policy discussion. Scenarios4Summits designs scenarios for senior (ministerial, head of government) audiences. This presents particular problems: senior leaders and their staff don’t like to be surprised, there are multiple political sensitivities, and the scenario needs to be very up-to-date.

They work with professional actors and high-quality video, using realistic scenarios, detailed scripts, and considerable fact-checking. The scenarios are intended to act as a prompt to discussion. He stressed the importance of audience acceptance.

Michael Lee discussed one approach to wargaming wide area persistent messaging in information operations. They did this by identifying technologies and approaches, grouping them into categories, and then developing comprehensive sets. The cells were given a chance to develop hypothetical capability sets, which were then tested against a scenario. The sets were then refined, and tested against new scenarios. Actual game play involved technology and platform cards: each Blue cell was allowed to select from a pool of these. The local population groups were profiled for literacy, ICT access, population density, and so forth. Set refinement and multiple scenarios encouraged innovative combinations.

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WAPM cards on display during the games fair.

Much of the subsequent discussion addressed similarities and differences between the approaches presented by the speakers, as well elements of commonality (or differences) with traditional wargaming. One question regarding summit scenarios involved the tension between making scenarios simple enough for senior leaders yet complex enough for staff with subject matter expertise. Mark noted that while the vignettes were really designed for senior (ministerial) participants, the scenarios nonetheless provided an opportunity for technical staff to more fully inform seniors on the intricacies of the challenge presented. It occurred to me that a related problem might be that of senior participants posturing: that is, behaving in ways intended to impress counterparts, rather than more cynically pursuing national or political interests.

The conference then moved to the first of two “games fair” sessions. In part years I’ve been running games, leaving little chance to see what other games were on display. This time I opted not to sign up for any so that I could tour the demonstrations. Unfortunately I didn’t manage to get pictures of them all.

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Camberley Kriegsspiel (Andrew Sharpe and Ivor Gardiner)

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Dilemma Analysis (Michael Young)

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TacCyber Wargame (Roke, photo by Tom Mouat)

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Urban Ops (Sebastien de Peyret, photo by Tom Mouat)

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Cyber wargame (Andreas Haggman, photo by Tom Mouat)

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Bellum Baltica matrix wargame (Johan Elg, photo by Tom Mouat)

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Teamwork BG (Swen Stoop)

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Wargame 2020 (Jim Wallman)

I’ll admit that I ended up volunteering myself to join Jim Wallman’s Wargame 2020 as part of the Red Team rebels holding Folkestone against a Blue attack. I think we did well in blunting the enemy’s offensive.

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Our MRL and artillery batteries, after they flattened Blue’s rear echelon support units and just before they were hammered by Blue counter-battery fire. Clearly the crews should have practised their shoot-and-scoot.

The final plenary session of the day was my own keynote address on Ten (Not Entirely Randomly-Generated) Reflections on the Social Science of Wargaming. I won’t summarize what I had to say, since you can find the slides here, and the video below.

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There was a second opportunity to play games after dinner. I ended up running a hastily-organized game of AFTERSHOCK for a couple of officers from UK Standing Joint Force Headquarters and a few conference attendees.

Thursday morning started of with a panel on computer simulation and technology, chaired by Éric Jacobin. Dave Robson and Samantha Black (NSC) presented on technology in support of wargaming, focusing on professional military educational wargaming. Dave argued that technology allows a platform to include communication tools, extensive information, and a common operational picture. Samantha argued that computerized simulations had several strengths, in that they supported rapid calculation (useful for calculation-intensive aspects such as line-of-sight, etc.), avoided emotional bias, facilitated record-keeping and analysis, and are not always expensive. Validation of an educational simulation could be achieved through repeated use, and in many cases simulations only need to be “good enough” since they can be overridden by the White Cell. Digital simulations also can support humans-in-the loop to address aspects that aren’t easily modeled. Simulations are data-driven, which is both a down-side (data preparation) and a strength (supporting multiple use once the data is in place). Mistakes will be made, even by the computer and its model. These can often be treated as “fog of war,” although one can also roll back the simulation or override the digital simulation.

  • Hide the simulation from the users, if possible.
  • Choose an appropriate simulation.
  • Reduce complexity (and be prepared to use subject matter expertise).
  • Emulate the functionality of C3I

Next, Mark Gould (Dstl) discussed CAEn—Close Action Environment, a digital wargame intended primarily for analytical purpose. CAEn allows detailed terrain and unit/platform simulation for platoon and company actions in a simulated area up to 5x5km. He discussed human-in-the-loop digital wargaming, and the issue of corrective human intervention in game outcomes (versus trying to develop sophisticated AI). Analytically, the CAEn team will follow through the critical elements of the wargame, and replicate this with a focus on critical junctures. This allows them to assess how plausible these are. He concluded by identify key strengths of CAEn:

  • Honest (if low-res) graphics.
  • Unique blend of rigour and creativity.
  • Relatively quick or cheap (for what it does).
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CAEn in action during the games fair.

He suggested that CAEn should not be used if you are short on time and money, if large scales (terrain and/or forces) are required, or if large amounts of quantitative data is required.

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The next plenary session featured Stacie Pettyjohn (RAND) speaking on strategic gaming—why it is languished, and how it can be improved. She started by defining strategic gaming, and contrasting this with operational-tactical gaming. Operational games vary in terms of both structure (low/high) and transparency (low/high). However, strategic games tend to be loosely structured, and most are (low structure/low transparency) seminar games. Indeed, she suggested, most seminar games are BOGSATs in which players “admire the problem” and many players arrive with their own “pet rock” talking points, resulting in few innovative ideas. She suggested that manual boardgames are often more useful (when a problem is well understood), since they provide a structure that focuses player attention. However boardgames do risk being dismissed by some audiences as juvenile. There was also a risk that the game rules might distort or misrepresent key strategic dynamics or interests.

As an example of a strategic boardgame Stacie pointed to the Countering-ISIL game she is developing at RAND, based on ideas that emerged from the rapid game design session at last year’s MORS wargaming meeting. Having cofacilitated that session with Brian Train, Robert Leonhard and others I was particularly happy to see how those initial seeds of idea had developed!

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Stacie Pettyjohn discusses strategic wargaming.

The next panel, chaired by Colin Marston (Dstl) looked at successful real-world wargames. Jeff Appleget (NPGS) offered a presentation, coauthored by Rob Burks, on wargaming at the Naval Postgraduate School. He offered several examples: wargaming hybrid warfare in the Arctic (as part of a course on the topic); countering ISIL’s foreign fighter recruitment; exploring the distributed lethality operating concept; defence support to civil authorities (using AFTERSHOCK as part of game design process); wargaming the US Army Pacific CONPLAN (which required considerable security vetting); undersea communication and other technologies; and mass atrocity response. On occasion they’ve done wargames for foreign sponsors, including Norway (hybrid threats) and the Royal Canadian Navy (non-lethal weapons for boarding parties), and also delivered wargaming courses in the US and abroad.

Roger Mason addressed wargaming in the intelligence community. One challenge, he noted, is that once one designs a game it is rarely really clear what is done with it after you hand off the game. National intelligence agencies design their own games, use commercial games, commission games, and monitor other people’s games. Publicly-funded think-tanks (like RAND or CNA) are wargaming too, as are commercial intelligence providers (such as Wikistrat and Stratfor) and academic institutions. Even the Vatican uses scenario planning.

Ivanka Barzaska (KCL) discussed understanding how missile defence affects nuclear deterrence and stability through gaming. She argued that Cold War era modelling of nuclear exchanges are outdated, since contemporary use would like be more limited and constrained. Her research proposes three strategic gaming events, using NATO and (ideally) Russian participants. The games are not intended to test hypotheses, but rather would form part of a mixed-method exploration of highly uncertain issues, acting as a semi-structured interview of sorts. The games could also serve as an informal Track 2 or Track 1.5 process to help educate official about the impact of BMD.

In the subsequent Q&A it was questioned whether wargames were actually having any effect on policy, or whether they had simply become trendy tick-the-box processes.

After lunch, Stephen Downes Martin (NWC) chaired a session on wargaming innovations. Paul Vebber (Naval Undersea Warfare Center) discussed wargaming for innovation. He identified several types of innovation, and emphasized that wargaming ought to form part of the broader cycle of research. Wargaming is particularly useful for issues that involve substantial human decision-making. He spoke of the value of gaming at the various stages of addressing a problem: problem framing, problem exploration, solution framing, synthesis (and game design), solution exploration (playing the game).

Ellie Bartels (RAND) then explored resolving hidden information in open adjudication. Specifically she argued that open adjudication can be a key way of gaming emerging issues (especially when Control doesn’t know more about the issue than the players). However, many emerging issues (deterrence, hybrid warfare, cyber, terrorism, etc.) involve hidden information. Games may hide motivations, actions, capabilities, or effects. Masking actions, capabilities, and effects is more challenging than masking motives. She went on describe how to capture fog of war effects with limited map visibility, separate maps,  or flipped counters, as well as the use of cards to keep information private. She also addressed alternative models for hidden information such as face validity (whereby players challenge processes when results seem implausible) and zero-knowledge protocols (where results are validated by repeated partial observation). There were a couple of interesting suggestions from the audience on additional approaches during the Q&A.

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Ellie addresses the challenge of hidden information in open adjudication games.

Laura Hoffman (KCL) offered her perspective, as a former student, on wargaming at KCL. She was very enthusiastic about Phil Sabin’s conflict simulation course (and indeed disagreed with some of the cautionary notes I had sounded during my keynote address), although initially she felt out of her depth. She noted that she playtested and revised the game so many times that her friends grew sick of it, and was forced to play with family members over Skype. Laura found game design changed her perspective, offered an opportunity for a deep dive into her topic (the war in Darfur), and was a different learning approach. Subsequently she served as a teaching assistant in an undergraduate course, which provided a further opportunity to understand the educational value of gaming. She argued that megagaming and other wargaming was a better learning experience than model United Nations, and that there is genuine student interest in conflict simulation. One interesting question from the audience raised the potential difficulty of grading a game design.

The last part of the conference was taken up breakout sessions devoted to the challenge of how might we institutionalize wargaming and build wargaming capacity? Different working groups addressed this in the context of particular groups and audiences:

  • frontline (military, emergency service) personnel
  • defence science and technology
  • military education and training
  • historical analysis/conflict analysis
  • academia
  • industry
  • hobby gamers

I co-facilitated the academic breakout group with Phil Sabin (KCL). Much of the discussion focused on the need to establish professional respect and validation for educational wargaming. I was struck how the challenges differed across disciplines and university settings. In my own field of political science, there is widespread support for games-based learning, and games-based analysis wouldn’t be difficult sell either. Conversely, Phil has often commented on the resistance he sometimes encounters from fellow military historians. In civilian university, especially in North America, instructors have considerable latitude as to what and how they teach. In the military, however, there are often hierarchies and institutional requirements that deter or inhibit pedagogical innovation. We also addressed labelling (“wargaming” vs “conflict simulation”), student interest, whether there ought to be an academic wargaming journal (I’m dubious), and how best to support the sharing of ideas and experiences (in part, to encourage others  who might be interested in gaming but reluctant to try it to “come out of the closet”). There might also be scope for using new technology—for example, YouTube videos—to provide lessons in game design and facilitation.

The hobby game group noted that they were an “expendable and deniable” resource for more serious gaming, able to bring historical knowledge, a different subculture, and extyensive experience in game design and mechanics. Their contributions might include support to Red and Blue (and other teams), playtesting, and facilitation expertise.

The industry group addressed both the industry as a resource and gaming within the business sector. They noted the importance of having access to senior people. The concept of red teaming sometimes provides a hook which can lead on to wargaming. They also noted that interest among individuals doesn’t necessarily translate into continuing  institutional support.

The historical analysis group identified a lack of resources (time, money, people) as the major obstacle to institutionalizing wargaming and creating a safe space for experimentation. There was a general feeling that new officers were not necessarily well-prepared for the uncertainties of future war, and that getting at officers early in their careers and exposing them to quick (possibly recent-historical) wargames could be very useful. Those with experience in recent campaigns could be a valuable resource for this. There was also a need for outreach to, and sharing with, the broader wargame community.

The professional military education group also stressed the need for accessible games, and the value of having games recommended on military reading lists. There needed to be more outreach and publication in appropriate venues, and more collection of evidence as to the effectiveness of wargaming as a teaching and learning technique. Student feedback is essential.

The defence science and technology group raised the need for more cumulated knowledge, and the value of better understanding client needs. They pointed to a degree of disconnect between wargamers and technology. There was interest in, but debate about, an accredited professional society. Publication in peer-reviewed journal was also seen as valuable.

Finally, the “front-line” military and civil group  reported. They noted that wargames were occurring at various points in the planning cycle: risk assessment, planning, training, and exercise/response/capacity development. Wargaming is a planning tool that offers insight into how groups of people will respond to a challenge. Ivor Gardiner enthusiastically emphasized the value of wargaming as a cheap, highly effective training method that saves lives.

Phil Pournelle made some overall comments. He identified one key cross-cutting theme was that of credibility: of the method, with superiors, and among participants. He also emphasized the importance of games being somewhere where it was “safe to fail,” and he also emphasized the importance of “catching them young.” Phil noted the vast reservoir of knowledge in the hobby and industry. He challenged the wargaming community to better understand the analytical needs of the US DoD, UK MoD, and other clients, and thereby be better able to make the case for wargaming. Matt Caffrey offered three more observations: first, the professional wargaming community does want the support of hobby gamers and industry; second, that we needed to document and archive wargaming more carefully, lest it be lost to history; and finally that no matter what wargamers do, young men and women will die—but if we wargame well, perhaps fewer lives will be lost and fewer resources spent.

In summing up the conference, Phil Sabin said he thought it was the best yet. I have to agree. The presentations and discussions were excellent, the atmosphere was enjoyable and productive, and the networking opportunities were outstanding.

Slides and recordings will be have now been posted soon to the Connections UK website. You’ll also find an account of the conference at Bob Cordery’s blog, Wargaming Miscellany.

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Connections UK 2016: Civil War in Binni

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The serious conference component of the Connections UK 2016 professional wargaming conference starts tomorrow, with two days of plenary presentations, working groups, and game demonstrations. Today, however, many of the participants gathered to play the Civil War in Binni megagame, designed by Jim Wallman.

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The fictional country of Binni featured a dictatorial President, sectarian divisions, multiple rebel groups, terrorism, refugees, humanitarian crisis, conniving neighbours, a concerned and often divided  international community, covert intervention, and UN agencies. New elections were held, but under the regime’s old electoral laws which strongly favoured the incumbent. When the President was reelected in a dubious ballot, Christian militias seized the capital. The President was killed, and the country seemed poised to collapse deeper into chaos.

I served with Stephen Downes-Martin as the UN Control team, and my after-action review slides can be found here (although they will likely make little sense to anyone who wasn’t there). The photos below are courtesy of Tom Mouat. Everyone seemed to enjoy themselves a great deal, and some serious points were also made about wargame design and execution.

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Initial conditions.

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Moves underway at the map table.

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Global News Network at work.

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News headlines.

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Influence-peddling.

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UN Security Council meeting.

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The UN SRSG checks the map table as various negotiations continue.

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Christian militias seize the capital.

Clashing in the classroom

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Yeah I’m working in Harrisburg
Working hard in Petersburg (working for the clampdown, working for the clampdown)
Ha! Gitalong! Gitalong!
Beggin’ to be melted down

What do early 1980s  The Clash punk lyrics  have to do with serious games? Nothing at all, other than I’m writing this in the airport in Harrisburg, PA. Ever since we flew over Three Mile Island on the incoming flight I have had the song Working for the Clampdown stuck in my head.

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The morning sun bathes scenic Three Mile Island in a faintly radioactive light. It would have been nice to linger, but we had to SCRAM

Rather than working for the clampdown, however, I spent Saturday in nearby Carlisle taking part in a US Army War College panel discussion on wargaming in the classroom. The primary focus, not surprisingly, was on professional military education (PME). I also ran two of the several demonstration games featured at the event. Over two dozen people participated.

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Setting up the event.

The first panelist was Peter Perla (CNA), who made the general case for the value of wargaming. Key to what Peter had to say was the emphasis he placed on process rather than outcome: while the outcome of a game is not irrelevant, it is what goes in the mind of the player that is of key importance. I couldn’t agree more, and it points to why building an engaging game narrative is such an important part of effective wargaming.

I presented next, identifying a number of serious game “worst practices” that was partially inspired by a 2004 US Naval War College and CNA study on (analytic) wargaming pathologies. Specifically, I addressed the dangers of:

  • Gaming for gaming’s sake. Problems soon arise when instructors devote inadequate attention to how and why they are using a game, and how this might support course learning objectives. Gaming enthusiasm is no substitute for effective teaching. One also needs to be clear about the opportunity costs of using scarce contact hours for games that might be used for other activities. It should be noted that learning is not the only reason to game in a classroom: a game can also serve break the ice in a  new group, promote networking, and to help assess student abilities.
  • Assuming that games teach themselves. How will you know that players are learning the appropriate lessons? Properly prebriefing and debriefing games is essential. I also pointed to the danger of gamer mode, whereby players exploit game rules (such as unflankable map edges, zone of control rules, or using disposable units as “speed bumps”) or computer AI to secure victories in ways that would not work in real life or otherwise be inappropriate.
  • Not listening to participants. If instructors want to know what students are taking away from the game, and whether the experience was worthwhile, be sure to ask them. While self-assessment is not always a reliable indicator of actual learning, eliciting feedback will help to identify problems and shortcomings.
  • All game, no gaming. One can take this last point further, and elicit feedback on the game system itself and encourage students to suggest possible game modifications. Indeed, encouraging students to think as game designers, and not just as game players, appears to improve learning outcomes. In the context of professional military eduaction is also serves to enhance critical knowledge of wargaming, thus leaving participants better-equipped to assess the value of future games, derive the greatest value from a game, or even help to design or facilitate one.

James Sterrett ( Deputy Chief, Simulations Division,  Digital Leader Development Center, US Army Command and General Staff College) then offered some thoughts based on his experience of supporting and encouraging classroom wargaming at CGSC. He emphasized the practical considerations that affect what sort of game will be useful and appropriate, and the need to design educational wargames and scenarios so that they are fit for educational purpose. One-size-fits-all solutions, he suggested, rarely work well. He also highlighted that not all instructors are the same, and that classroom wargaming approaches need to take account of a teacher’s strengths and weaknesses too.

Finally, James Lacey (Marine Corps War College) focused most of his comments on the obstacles to the use of wargames to teach strategy in professional military education. He suggested that PME institutions tend to be too rigid and structured, and discourage instructors from experiment. He also mentioned some of the criticism his critique, has received and—in typical fashion–pushed back hard. In subsequent discussion Peter noted that despite the current DoD push for more and better wargaming (inspired by the DEPSECDEF memo of February 2015), this has largely focused on analytical gaming with no clear direction from the top to more fully and effectively integrate gaming into PME.

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Playing AFTERSHOCK. What is the UN so happy about?

After a Q&A period, the rest of the day was devoted to demonstration games. I ran a session of AFTERSHOCK: A Humanitarian Crisis Game. The foreign military contengents of the joint HADR-Task Force did an exceptional job of quickly repairing the damaged airport and port. A critical moment in the game came when the NGO team unintentionally delayed implementation of a water infrastructure project in District Five, only to see the area stricken soon after with a dangerous outbreak of cholera. The United Nations—possibly having learnt from its real-life experience in Haiti—already had a cholera response programme readied, and was able to both halt epidemic and provide improved water facilities to prevent future outbreaks.

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The United Nations responds to the cholera emergency.

The players were headed for a well-earned victory when we had to call an end to the game for reasons of time (not to mention my need to eat before the cafe at the US Army Heritage and Education Center closed for the day).

After a quick sandwich, I also ran several turns of the ISIS Crisis matrix game. The Iraqi government sought to build on its successes earlier this year in Fallujah and Ramadi by launching a bold, Patton-esque thrust along the Euphrates Valley towards the border town of al-Qa’im—hoping thereby the sever an important ISIS line of communication and further isolate Mosul. The attack, however, was hastily organized and went disastrously wrong. Local Sunni tribes were angered that the campaign had been supported by Shiite militias rather than coordinated with them, while ISIS benefitted from both a  morale boost and the capture of significant military equipment. ISIS also plotted terrorist attacks in Iraq and abroad—one of which, aimed against NATO facilities in Brussels, was foiled in the nick of time by an alert Belgian police officer.

The failure of the operation also aggravated growing tensions between Baghdad’s Iranian and US allies. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi used the defeat to justify a large-scale purge and reform of the Iraqi armed forces in an attempt to build a more competent and professional military. In doing so, however, he relied heavily on Iranian advice, advisors, and money—causing the US to temporarily withdraw some of its own advisors in protest. Washington also signalled its dissatisfaction with the Iraqi central government by providing the Kurdish Regional Government with heavier weapons. That, of course, only further annoyed Baghdad, which briefly closed its airspace to US aircraft. Meanwhile, Iraqi Sunni leaders were dismayed both by growing Iranian influence and by the government’s failure to deliver on its promise of a new law that would see more petroleum revenues invested in Sunni areas. Scandals and acrimony dominated the political process, and national unity seemed more distant than ever. Amidst all this, ISIS capitalized on the disarray by rebuilding its network of supporters in government-controlled areas of Anbar province.

All in all, I very heard some thoughtful commentary at the event, made new contacts, played some games, and otherwise very much enjoyed myself. I’m very grateful to MAJ Dennis Davis and his colleagues at the US AWC Center for Strategic Leadership for having me down.

UPDATE: You’ll also find a report on the event by John Carter McKnight (Harrisburg University of Science and Technology) at his blog Aporia.

Oh, and as for that song…

 

 

Connections 2016 conference report

The following report on the recent Connections (US) interdisciplinary wargaming conference was provided by Major Tom Mouat (UK Army). All views expressed herein are personal ones.


 

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In a moment of madness, I agreed with Rex Brynen that I would attempt to put together a report on Connections 2016 for PAXsims – and this is my attempt at such a report. It is important to warn you that Rex normally types on this laptop during the proceedings at a conference and is thus able to provide a contemporaneous report of what occurred. This was simply not possible for me; firstly, because I lack the expertise (I need to think about stuff for a lot longer than he does and I type really slowly) and secondly, because the conference took place in the excellent facilities of the Lemay Centre Wargaming Institute at Maxwell Airforce Base (which is a secure location – so no laptops, phones, etc).

This was unfortunate, as getting clearance to get on base was a significant hurdle to overcome and that, along with the added travel burden of not being on a non-stop flight location, made attendance much more difficult. If it wasn’t for the significant support from the on-site organiser, I wouldn’t have made it (but I believe I was the only “foreigner”). American Airlines didn’t help (missing my flight connections on the way in and making my return journey a 26hr marathon on the way back), but the Delta Airlines computer glitch messed up a lot of other people’s plans as well.

The conference programme is here  and the presentations should also be posted on the Connections website shortly.

Day 1

The initial session was a SECRET NOFORN (No Foreigners) brief, so I headed off with Matt Caffrey for an Introduction to Wargaming brief instead. Since the audience consisted of vastly experienced civilian wargamers and me, it turned into a feedback and support session on Matt’s briefing slides and a very pleasant chat about the best way to get the message about the importance of wargaming to an unfamiliar audience.

A number of useful things came out of this for me, one of which was the concept of tailoring Red force play in a wargame depending on the objectives of the event (What do you want Red to do? What should Red do for best value?)

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Next up was Cdr Phil Pournelle with a presentation on Improving Wargaming in the DOD. I have heard several elements of his presentation before, but his arguments (and slides) are developing in a way that is very useful in helping to explain the subject and issues to an often sceptical audience. I would definitely recommend taking a look at his slide pack when it is posted on-line.

The vexed question of the actual definition of a wargame came up again and Phil had bullied Peter Perla into providing another definition (a variant on his previous one) with phrases like “a dynamic representation of conflict”, “people”, “decisions” and “consequences”. The issue of having an agreed definition of wargaming (or even general agreement on whether it should be spelled “war gaming” or “wargaming”) was mentioned several times. The concern was that the field is so broad that an all-encompassing definition is so bland as to be useless, and a more precise definition always excludes some segment of the discipline. This, in turn, leads the practitioners (who are all protective of their particular sub-discipline) to meddle and nit-pick with the definition to no useful purpose.

My personal view is that this a complete waste of time and effort. It doesn’t matter what the definition is – what matters is what wargaming does and why you would want to do it. We should therefore agree on a bland all-encompassing definition (to satisfy those who say we need one), but add “with the aim of” and then individual departments are free to mess with their personal aims to their heart’s content – and we can then all get on with some productive work.

I really don’t care what the definition is – but it isn’t a Wargame unless Blue can fail. J

This was followed by Dr Shawn Burns presenting on the Game Project Management Process. This was given from the perspective of the US DOD, whose scale and reach is orders of magnitude larger than most other countries wargaming efforts, but nevertheless the basics are applicable to all projects. The project management flow of: Task – Design – Development – Testing – Rehearsal – Execution – Analysis – Archive was clear and sensible, but his insight into the concept of Jidoka (taken from the Toyota production system) and the “5 Whys” was of particular interest.

The overall concept is summarised here, but the “5 Whys” process is simply the iterative process of asking “why” until the root cause of a problem is discovered. Shawn’s view (and I wholeheartedly support it) was that you should do the same with your Wargame Sponsor to work out what the sponsor really wants to achieve (which may be completely different to what you thought it was—or even from what he thought it was!).

The presentation on the OSD Wargaming Initiative was fascinating insight into how the Wargaming Repository project (a result of the DEPSECDEF memo) and US DOD process management was progressing. What was clear is that significant funding has been made available for wargaming initiatives (significant at least for the rest of us – they might seem small as DOD projects go), and the risk that things that weren’t really wargames would be classed as such in order to get money. There was a responsibility for those involved in wargaming to use the repository and to ensure that they get their messaging right to compensate for this.

There then followed Service briefs for the different environments which, while I was able to recognise more words after attending several Connections conferences, the majority of it went straight over my head. I can only presume that it served the vital function of maintaining “situational awareness” among the other Service branches – but from my outsider’s view it appeared to me that many of the challenges faced were very similar and that the USMC had the most coherent plan (and funding) for dealing with them. Time will tell if this is the case.

There seemed to me to be quite a lot on explaining procedural issues within the US DOD, fostering connections (!) and explaining structures and rather less on sharing best practice – but it takes a brave person to say something is “best practice” in front of this audience.

Cdr Chris Baker’s presentation on Stakeholder Management was good and matched my experiences in the UK Defence Procurement organisation. Far too many people in management positions seem to expect stakeholders merely to be asked their opinion (irrespective of whether they have any qualifications or formal training in the subject) (as opposed to just being appointed to their position) as if by aggregating these views together wisdom or innovation will magically appear. Leadership is required, as typified by the quote from Dr James Brown “Stakeholders expect you to lead… manage expectations… even if they are more powerful than you are”; if time is not to be wasted repeating work already done, or money wasted on “shiny toys” that don’t contribute to the outcomes we need.

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As always Dr Stephen Downes-Martin’s talk on Wargaming Pathologies was really excellent – brutal and uncompromising in shining a light on why things go bad, but offering clear advice on what can be done. None of the advice was easy or trivial: You need deep knowledge and competence in your subject, Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP), objective analysis of what we are trying to achieve and the results we gained, and above all, morale courage to ensure that we do the right thing. Too many wargames are compromised by a lack of professional ethics, competence and courage in the face of your Boss, the Sponsor and Senior Players.

We also had Lt Gen Steven L Kwast, Commander Air University, provide a particularly rousing keynote address. There might have been some criticism that his words might be somewhat lacking in practical results, but the very fact that a 3-Star Officer was taking the time to address the conference and say the right things, shows he is aware of the issues and understands the desired direction of travel. I especially liked his comments on “smart risk” and his use of the language of insurgency in order to get the message through to younger personnel. He mentioned the book Orbiting the Giant Hairball: A Corporate Fool’s Guide to Surviving with Grace by Gordon MacKenzie as an example of overcoming the tangled mess of corporate rules, systems, procedures and red tape, which has had very good reviews (including by Sally Jewell the US Secretary of the Interior): .

We then had explanations about various working groups and game labs. I elected to get involved in Matt Caffery’s group on “Growing Tomorrows’ Innovators” and did a demonstration session of a Cyber Matrix Game (a simplified version is available here: https://1drv.ms/f/s!ArdcexVTLJ4Pgdle6885ZelqslZHiw).

This was followed by some extremely useful discussions in the evening at the icebreaker no-host event.

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Day 2

This started with Dr Burns’ presentation on Cyber Wargaming which we missed the preceding day. This was very useful – particularly for me as at the Defence Academy of the UK, the Simulation, Modelling and Wargaming department works to the Cyber and Information Management department and we run a cyber wargame as part of the Cyber Operational Awareness Course.

A number of helpful points were raised, based on Prof Stephanie Helm’s work looking into Cyber Considerations for Wargaming:

  • What is “Cyber”? How do you define “Cyber”? (How do you define Wargaming?)
  • The relationship between Cyber and Electronic Warfare (EW) or Information Operations (IO).
  • Operational factors such as Time, Space and levels of Force.
  • What does a Cyber Common Operational Picture (COP) look like?
  • What is Offensive Cyber?
  • What is Defensive Cyber?

From this fall out important questions that need to be addressed when designing a wargame that incorporates Cyber elements. Where does Cyber fit at the strategic level? How does it fit into the game objectives? Are the issues relevant to the decisions being made? Who is the bad guy?

We then covered the vexed problem of classification. Many aspects of operational Cyber capabilities are very highly classified; not just the ways and means, but the organisations and their relationships. This severely restricts the ability to wargame (or even discuss) the issues to gain the insights so badly needed. Is it possible to separate out the classified “actors, ways and means” from the unclassified and generalised “effects”?

This was a very helpful, and I shall be briefing this presentation specifically back to my department when the slides become available.

We were then privileged to have Brig Gen Brian M. Killough, Director of Strategy, Concepts and Assessments, Dep Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, HQ USAF give us a presentation on the Wargaming Enterprise.

General Killough, like General Kwast, inevitably demonstrated the General officer’s ability to start things off with a politically correct joke, but struck me as having a more grounded and realistic view of wargaming (warts and all) than the relentlessly upbeat talk from General Kwast. He also provided the first easy to understand view of what the 3rd Offset Strategy actually was.

I especially liked his points about including some of the weird stuff (avoiding predictable incrementalism) and the dangers of making wargames too big (because you simply don’t learn anything new). He was challenged on some points (after all he is “only a One-Star”), but I felt he gave frank and honest responses about the difficulties to be faced in the current fiscal environment. “Show me your cheque-book and I’ll show you what is important to you.”

Wargaming is not a science but I believe that several of our senior leadership understand the value of it – but equally they realise that it is an art form, so it can’t be mandated. It also is really hard to quantify, consequently they will have extreme challenges in funding and priorities, so I suspect that the best we can really hope for is encouragement and support. As Cdr Phil Pournelle said “we really ought to be able to game the system to get what we want – if we really call ourselves wargamers…”.

This was followed by an absolutely fascinating presentation by Robert Mosher entitled “Observations from a Role Player”, giving really grounded and sensible advice on the role of role-players, their functions, how to manage and prepare them properly and some top tips, such as:

  • Don’t fight the White (the exercise scenario). (Nit picking the scenario won’t help at this stage).
  • Understand the role/training objectives. (Not all roles are created equal and you have a function to do).
  • Ask questions early. (Don’t make too many assumptions)
  • Draw on your real world experience (in context).
  • Remember you are in Atropia now! (read your brief and don’t assume it’s just like Kansas…).
  • Be there for real-world mentoring. (Experience in these roles is transferable).

He was able to draw on his great depth of experience to illustrate his points with practical examples. His brief exactly matched my experience in that having role-play and experience role-players is incredibly valuable – especially in the situations the military find themselves in today’s operations (and his experience is pretty much second to none!).

During the preparations for the NATO deployment to Bosnia in 1994 some of the most valuable lessons (such as the need for a Political Advisor to the Commander and the need for a “Joint Military Commission” to handle all communication and dealing with the factions) came directly out of role-play sessions in the work-up training exercises and had not been foreseen beforehand.

Following the Working Groups initial discussions and lunch (I have to point out here that the fresh fruit and endless coffee / iced water were are real boon and very much appreciated) we went into speaker panels.

Panel One was Chaired by Dr Downes-Martin and looked at ideas and techniques explicitly intended to test to destruction proposed “innovative wargaming concepts”, which featured Dr. Hank Brightman (Naval War College) “Employing Qualitative Methods in the Destructive Testing of War Game Designs”; Dr. Jonathan Lockwood (Lockwood Research Associates, LLC) “Strategic Free Play Wargaming as the Optimum Approach for Testing New Concepts” and Dr. Yuna Wong (RAND) “Did Your Concept or Your Wargame Fail?”.

C2016-4There were a lot of good ideas and concept in these presentations. I was struck by the idea (that matched several speaker’s comments) that before you embark on a quantitative model, you really need to explain and demonstrate a qualitative model to start with – because if you can’t then it is highly likely that your quantitative model has shaky foundations. Dr Wong, as usual was compelling in her presentation – if we pretend to be scientists or engineers, we should try to employ the scientific method, Discover, Demonstrate, Support, Refute, Replicate and examine our validity criteria: Construct validity, internal validity and external validity. Do wargames generate innovation? Or is it that innovative organisations use wargames? Is wargaming an indicator of an innovative organisation rather than a generator of innovation itself?

The second panel, to Explore the effectiveness and feasibility of options to facilitate the development of innovators, was Chaired by Matt Caffrey with Major Eric Frahm, LCWI, Back to the Future: Revisiting Small-Scale Wargames and the Integration of M&S into Wargame Design; Dr. Mel Deaile, Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies, The Risk of Wargaming and Joseph M. Saur, MS/CS, CMSP, Principal Lecturer in Cybersecurity, Regent University, “Teaching Wargaming at Marine Corps University: Lessons Learned”.

This panel was right on the money for me with discussions on the scale of wargames (we don’t need big games to be effective), the dangers of “Gamer Mode” (See Anders Frank’s doctoral thesis on the subject) and the often dreadfully biased assumptions made by many involved.

In the evening I was able to demonstrate the Sandhurst Kriegsspiel, used in teaching cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (available here).

Day 3

On Day 3 we were privileged to have a presentation by Colonel John Warden (ret.) (the man responsible for starting the whole Connections conference off in the first place). He spoke without notes and laid out his vision of low cost, small footprint, short war interventions.

This was followed by the third speaker panel, Wargaming and Organizational Change, with the objective to explore ways to implement the appropriate application of wargaming. The Chair was Paul Vebber with Dr. John Tiller, John Tiller Software, Strategies for Organizational Change, A Practical Approach; Michael K. Robel, Principle Senior System Engineer, General Dynamics Information Technology, Innovations in Outcome Based Training for Seminar Wargames; and Dr. Thomas Choinski, Deputy Director for Undersea Warfare, Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Macro Perspectives on Wargame Culture and Innovation.

There were some interesting ideas, particularly on Action Theory with regards to wargaming and innovation, taking an artefact, the system of manufacture, the technique and then the system of use; translating to Science and Engineering, Acquisition, and Doctrine, to the Warfighter. When considering computer simulation, Cdr Pournelle made the observation that if we are after innovation in ends, ways, means and methods, then using a simulation, by definition, handicaps your chances as it can only do what has been programmed into it – it is simply impossible to do something new (except in the most trivial of ways). It was interesting, however, to see direct parallels when considering the success factors in computer wargame design with manual wargame designs, in that it is important it looks good, it has a serious purpose, it is easy to get started with, it is engaging to play, it is easy to modify and it needs an advocate to provide “top cover”.

I then outlined the recent advances in Wargaming in the UK which were guardedly promising but still hampered by a lack of doctrine and the Connections UK Conference taking place on 06 to 08 September 2016 (see here for details).

Further sessions of the game labs were then continued. I volunteered to run a session in which we designed and ran a Matrix Game from scratch. I am extremely grateful to my willing bunch of volunteers for jumping in so whole-heartedly and putting up with my adjudication. We managed to do a run through of a scenario set in a Mega-City in Africa to a suitable finishing point within about 2 hours and then spent some time discussing Matrix Games. I have typed up a copy of the game (with a few changes) here.

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This was most useful and, in keeping with Prof Downes-Martin’s exhortation to be intellectually honest, led to the production of a short SWOT analysis of Matrix Games.

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Day 4

Day 4 was really briefing back the results of the Game Labs and the Working Groups. The brief from Matt Caffery’s Working Group on “Growing Tomorrow’s Wargame Innovators” almost exactly matched the conclusion that we had come to in the UK. There is a need for a graduated set of training courses following the Awareness – Practitioner – Expert model of training, with some form of short “Master Class” for senior officers. Our proposal is to have the Awareness Training available on-line (and this is in-hand), with the rest a mix of classroom sessions and distance learning. A Training Needs Analysis is currently underway and a business case will follow early next year.

The brief from Paul Vebber about designing an educational game, for non-military, non-wargamers to do with Naval Warfare in a complex environment, was very interesting. Called “Waves of Destiny” (and winning from the title alone!) it was intended as a very simple game to educate people about capabilities. I hope to be following this up later and look forward to playtesting the results.

Essentially there was a realisation that we need simple, accessible tools in order to train and educate people about understanding capability, learning to think against real opposition and also becoming “intimately or at least casually acquainted with a number of people that they might have occasion to work with or rely on in the future” (as Tom Shelling once noted).

The hot wash-up followed. This year’s attendance was lower than previously, mainly due to the location, but hopefully this will be fixed by returning to Quanitco and the Marine Corps next year. There were suggestions that we should put out a “Call for Papers”, deliberately invite or have a working group specifically for “under 35s”, and also invite the contributing authors to Zones of Control to participate.

Finally, I’ll leave you with a few quotes that I wrote in my notebook:

  • “Wargaming is a motivator to action not a quantifier of effect”.
  • “Wargaming should fix stupid”.
  • “We should play “The Game of Games” and work out how to get wargaming used more”.
  • “Games having analytically quantifiable results is necessary, but not sufficient”.
  • “The danger is that Wargaming can be taken too seriously, or not seriously enough”.
  • “Show me your chequebook and I’ll show you what is important to you”.

I was asked by a friend whether it was worth it for him to attend Connections after I returned to the UK. I was a little surprised at how difficult it was to answer the question. The problem is the sense of scale and range of professional wargaming in the USA – it is so large an enterprise and so full of specialisation that it can be difficult to find comparative value with the much smaller scale work carried out in Europe. Some of the presentations are only of interest (or be the least bit understandable) for the US DOD participants (but this is entirely fair). It also has somewhat of a “folksy charm” that might infuriate some people when everyone disperses at the end of the day to participate in game sessions in various rooms without some formal notice. The experienced attendee knows when to interrupt to announce a session and how to ferret out those individuals they want to speak with after the formal work is over. This might leave the first timer adrift and feeling left out. I found it to be full of ideas and moments of inspiration that make such an event essential to my professional development, but I think that much of the value is only gained by regular attendance – so I intend to be back next year!

Call for Participants: MORS Wargame Adjudication Working Group 17-20 October 2016

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Working Group 3 (“Adjudication”) at the MORS Wargaming Special Meeting (17-20 October 2016) is seeking participants!

For details of the special meeting and the registration page, see here.

Working Group 3 will address the questions “what are the barriers to doing the best possible job of adjudicating wargames?” and “how can we best overcome those barriers?” using a disciplined group methodology known as “Language Processing”™ in two sessions. Working Group Participants are expected to be competent and experienced wargame adjudicators. The Working Group will produce two linked products corresponding to the two questions in a format similar to a mind-map.

If you are interested and an experienced wargame adjudicator please contact the two Working Group Chairs, Timothy Wilkie and Stephen Downes-Martin, to discuss your participation as soon as possible, but before Friday 30 September at the latest. Thanks!

Stephen Downes-Martin

2016 APSA Teaching and Learning Conference: simulation and gaming track summary

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The latest issue of PS: Political Science & Politics 49, 3 (July 2016) contains a summary of the February 2016 APSA Teaching and Learning Conference, including the simulation and gaming track:

SIMULATIONS AND GAMES: APPLICATIONS

George A. Waller, University of Wisconsin Colleges, Fox Valley

Adam Wunische, Boston College

One of the particular problems that was highlighted at this year’s conference was the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of simulations for enhancing student learning. For several of the papers presented, success was measured by either student self-assessment or student satisfaction. If students reported that they felt the simulation enhanced their understanding of course material, the simulation was judged to be effective. It was noted that, while this data is important and helps make the case for the use of simulations in political science classrooms, administrators and detractors often need more convincing objective evidence that simulations do, in fact, generate greater student understanding of course content. Discussion on this topic during the paper presentations centered around three things: 1) that the major advantages of simulations include the development of soft skills such as empathy and active learning, which are difficult to measure in the first place; 2) that subjective student assessments of simulation effectiveness may not equate to objective measures of student learning; and 3) that the measurable impacts may be more long term and can only be observed in subsequent classes, beyond the normal timeframe for a posttest. Although presenters and attendees agree that simulations are fun and appear to enhance student engagement and satisfaction, more work needs to be done to explore ways to measure the actual impact of simulations on student learning.

A pivotal question, which was taken up by several of this year’s papers, was when and how simulations might best be utilized. Some types of simulations are perhaps best employed early in a semester or term, while others may be most effective or useful at midterm or near the end of a course. Simulation placement is an important consideration for instructors and should be tied directly to learning objectives for the course and for particular units/modules of the course. One paper proposed the idea that simulations might be more effective for entry-level students, or for students in introductory courses, rather than advanced students who have presumably already developed the soft skills and abilities that simulations are thought to foster. Another paper solved for this by adjusting the rules, roles, and sophistication for higher-level students to ensure the simulation remains challenging. Explaining the purpose of the simulation or game also helps to convince older or more nontraditional students that the games have academic value, increasing willingness to participate and the likelihood of successful outcomes.

It was also noted that increases in length and sophistication can serve as deterrents to both students and instructors. More complex simulations involve a good deal more care in design, planning, and setup by instructors who use them and often require a significant element of “troubleshooting” if things don’t go according to plan. Simulations that take place over multiple class sessions (sometimes even multiple weeks) must be carefully monitored and adjusted when problems arise or when expectations or objectives are not being realized. Some instructors solve for this by dividing simulation work into iterations to give students, and the instructor, time to reset and reflect. Others solve for this by using social networking software to streamline the process of interactions to reduce the instructor’s workload. While longer term, more complex simulations can be very well designed and implemented in some courses resulting in significant student and instructor satisfaction, shorter, simpler simulations can be quite effective for augmenting important course concepts and require less time and fewer opportunities for unexpected developments. In any case, whether to use longer, more complex, simulations or shorter, simpler ones is an important consideration that needs to align with course (or course unit) learning objectives.

Iterations and variety were employed by a number of track presenters. For the longer term extended simulations, the tasks and events in the simulation were spread out over time. For a particular paper presented on a campaign budget activity, events in the activity are spread out through the term and are supplemented by traditional lecture techniques. Other strategies include icebreaker type simulations that are short and simple. These get students, who otherwise might only be accustomed to nonactive teaching methods, to become familiar with the process before being overwhelmed by a resource-intensive, longer, or more complex simulation. These shorter simulations can also serve multiple functions. Students can learn about how multiple iterations of the prisoner’s dilemma change the outcome, while also meeting and working closely with their fellow students thus building the foundations for future group work.

Debriefing is an essential component of simulation pedagogy. Debriefs were mentioned as a way to mitigate some of the possible negative effects of simulations, and also to consolidate student learning. Possible negative effects of simulations include students losing “the game” and being upset or angry about that, or that the simulation fails to achieve the desired learning outcome. Debriefs can highlight the learning opportunities that come from both negative and positive outcomes and what lessons should have been learned. Debriefs can also help shift a student’s focus on personal shortcomings to the actual learning objectives of the simulation. Debriefs should clarify how the simulations are connected to course learning objectives, and what that means for the broader course curriculum.

 

SIMULATIONS AND GAMES: EVALUATIONS

Joseph W. Roberts, Roger Williams University

Nancy E. Wright, Long Island University, Brooklyn

Simulations and games have long been a key element of the university classroom. These active learning tools are designed to engage and motivate students. Complex topics that may not be as clear in assigned readings are presented in ways that encourage students to think critically, solve problems, and ask deeper questions. The key question is how do we, as educators, know that simulations are doing what we expect them to do? In 2016, as in previous years, the track was a lively mix of discussion and practice. Four critical themes emerged from the discussions: 1) What does success mean?; 2) Context matters for simulations; 3) Tradeoffs of using real versus imaginary simulations; and 4) Rigorous assessment is needed but that does not mean only quantitative assessment.

What Is a Successful Simulation or Game?

If we ask the question “Do simulations work?” we may or may not get a useful answer. In fact, this may not be the best question to ask, because different learning objectives, classroom configurations, and time or other resources, as well as instructor skill and other factors may impact the success of the simulation or game. For Simon Usherwood, the better questions to ask are “How do you design effective simulations?” and “What are effective implementations of simulations?” The key is building pedagogical tools and teaching simulation design to improve learning. Moreover, there is a need to bring the body of literature on teaching and learning to plan and implement high impact learning tools. Both of these questions relate to the real versus imaginary question below. Michelle Allendoerfer discussed the outsourcing of the design process to two upper-level undergraduate students, Tianshan Fullop and Jacob Warwick, in an independent study. The simulation was then used in Allendoerfer’s comparative politics class. This is an incredibly rich opportunity to develop deeper student knowledge of the issues (for both groups of students but particularly the two designers) and to show students collaborative work between professor and students. The success of the simulation must be thought of in terms of learning outcomes. Erin Baumann and John FitzGibbon discussed the use of crisis simulations to teach and approach the issues of effectiveness and motivation from both a perspective on the scholarship of teaching and learning and a perspective of cognitive psychology. For Baumann and FitzGibbon, the design of simulations must work within the broader context of learning outcomes. Including a different and important body of literature enhances the discussion of fidelity (closeness to reality) and systematization (increasing regularity of interactions even in a crisis environment)

Amanda Rosen and Nina Kollars explored ways to implement active learning and simulations in a methods classroom. The traditional laments by students in methods courses include that it is abstract, boring, and difficult. Rosen and Kollars address this by taking a local restaurant’s simple claim to have the best breakfast in town and ask the students to determine where the best breakfast is using the methods of political science. Students operationalize definitions, collect data, analyze the data, and complete a final paper. Rosen and Kollars do not have clear data on the effectiveness of the project save for course evaluations and expressed student interest (see below). There is no one best way to judge effectiveness.

Context Matters

When using simulations in class there are many issues that a professor needs to consider. Who are the students? What do they bring to the table? What type of simulation or game (i.e., low skill versus high skill; long simulations versus short simulations versus games; or in-class vs. online versus hybrid) meets the learning outcome needs of the professor and the students? The participants used different kinds of simulations or games to reach students in different ways. Victor Asal, Josh Caldon, Andrew Vitek, and Susan Bitter demonstrated and discussed a game taking no more than 10 minutes to play, the Running Game. Depending on the classroom or even university, students will have wildly different starting points in their understanding of inequality. This short game is extremely effective at getting students to understand the concepts of inequality and structure particularly in places where some forms of diversity might be more limited. In contrast, Joseph W. Roberts employed a multi-day simulation of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Given the breadth and depth of the issues in the conflict, the simulation is, by necessity, larger and more complex. However, this simulation was extremely effective in the small course (20 students) in which it was used because the number of roles for students was limited. A significantly larger classroom environment would be much more difficult. A third model of simulation size is shown in the paper by Andrew Schlewitz on the Washington Model Organization of American States (WMOAS). Any large-scale simulation of international relations (WMOAS, MUN, Model Arab League, Model EU, etc.) will have a real impact on learners from multiple institutions. With extensive survey data from student participants, Schlewitz showed real learning but in a largely extra-curricular role that supplements rather than supplants coursework.

Gretchen Knudsen Gee showed the unique challenges for professors in larger classes to get and keep students engaged. Simulations allow for greater involvement of students in and across large multi-section courses. Simulations may also provide for some continuity between sections, because though active learning techniques require more confident instructors, there may be a real fear of trying new things. Moreover, Gee’s paper shows that the resources for creating simulations are important to providing more realistic experiences.

Chad Raymond and Sally Gomaa provided a cautionary tale about context. The authors showed the pitfalls of using online tools for simulations in classrooms. In this case, the use of Flash video caused problems because of security settings, removal of Flash from computers, or other issues. Moreover, the original plan for the simulation experiment failed because the planned site was removed from the Internet. When planning a simulation, it is important to have backup plans and to test the systems well in advance.

Tradeoffs of Real vs. Imaginary Scenarios

Most participants agreed that both approaches are valuable in different ways. On the one hand, developing simulations around actual events imparts to students the opportunity and motivation to conduct research outside the classroom in an effort to learn more about the simulation’s assigned countries and events (see Gee, Roberts, Rosen and Kollars, or Schlewitz, for example). On the other hand, those students not as familiar as others with a region of the world where the simulation is taking place may be intimidated, especially if others are familiar. Moreover, focusing on actual events, especially current happenings, can draw students so much into the day-to-day progression of what is taking place that they may overlook the broader significance (e.g., acquisition of negotiating skills or empathy) that is the purpose of the simulation itself.

Nancy Wright combined certain elements of both the real and the imagined, with the former as the case of a project to harness electricity from methane gas in Lake Kivu, Rwanda, and indigenous displacement in the Central African Republic, and the latter as scenarios of the pre-colonial era in each of those countries, which especially in the case of the Central African Republic has very little data available. One of Wright’s key findings is that students can harness facts to place specific issues and events in a larger context, and where data are scarce, students can harness their imaginations to re-create historical situations and then reflect on why they imagine them the way that they do. Wright also points out that understanding students’ preconceived ideas can influence simulation design and operation particularly to counter the tendency to link a country solely to a particular crisis or atrocity.

Rigorous Assessment Does Not Have to Be Quantitative

The increasingly established trend of equating rigor with quantitative assessment is likely to obfuscate the evaluation of rigor in other equally meaningful ways. This is true for two reasons: quantitative analysis cannot explain everything, and it depends on data that may not always be available. There are other ways to assess the value of simulations and games beyond mere quantification. For example, Rosen and Kollars noted that while reliable data actually measuring the effectiveness of games on learning were not available, they did report that course evaluations, often cited as low for methods courses compared to other courses, were consistently high in the methods course that employed several illustrative games, and in fact a significant number of students wished for a second methods course, an outcome attributed to the use of games. Similarly, Roberts used the knowledge domains assessment model (Pettenger, West, and Young 2014) that is based on learning outcomes. By focusing on learning outcomes, the assessment better reflects the goals of the course, though such means of evaluation would not necessarily be counted in the context of traditional empirical assessment.

Nicholas Vaccaro is critical of the experimental and overtly empirical assessment models that are proposed by Baranowski and Weir (2015). Vaccaro notes that their use of “show and tell” infantilizes the process of disseminating useful and helpful pedagogical tools. Description has value and this should not be overlooked. Discussion about potential flaws in experimental design methodologies is critical. Is a pre/post or control/test group model necessary to show learning? Is it fair for one group to engage in high-impact practices and another not? Does the model proposed limit the assessment to environments that can establish two or more test groups? For example, in a small liberal arts university, a course might be taught biennially. This does not lend itself to testing effectiveness of a technique years apart. Ultimately, the issue comes down to the question “Is the medical clinical trial model an appropriate model for social science research?” The general consensus is that it is not always a useful model for research in teaching and learning.

References

Baranowski, Michael K., and Kimberley A. Weir. 2015. “Political Simulations: What We Know, What We Think We Know, and What We Still Need to Know.” Journal of Political Science Education 11(4): 391–403.

Pettenger, Mary, Douglas West, and Niki Young. 2014. “Assessing the Impact of Role Play Simulations on Learning in Canadian and US Classrooms.” International Studies Perspectives 15 (4): 491–508. doi: 10.1111/insp.12063

Connections (US) conference registration deadline fast approaching!

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Stephen Downes-Martin has asked us to post the following reminder about the registration deadline for the forthcoming Connections (US) interdisciplinary wargaming conference:
This year we have an exceptionally strong program.
The registration deadline—July 22—for the annual Connections US Wargaming Conference (9-12 August, Maxwell AFB AL) is fast approaching. Make sure you register soon in order to obtain automatic billeting on Maxwell Air Force Base! Go to https://connections-wargaming.com/registration/ and fill out the form!  We cannot guarantee getting your name to the base entry control points, so you could experience long delays the first day if you do not register by the deadline.
If you are a non-US participant see the GATE ENTRY INFORMATION section of the Registration Form.
If you have difficulty accessing the Connections US Website or if your work IT policy forbids you to connect to Google and Google docs (used by the Connections website) then please register from your home computer and account.
Our host facility, the LeMay Center Wargaming Institute, is within easy walking distance of our billets.  If you are flying into Montgomery (as opposed to flying into Atlanta or Birmingham and renting a car), you may wish to rent a cab to reach the base rather than pay for a rental car for several days.
Finally please distribute this message to any of your colleagues who might be interested but are not members of this site. Thanks!

Simulation & gaming miscellany, post-PDW edition

PDW

I recently returned from an extremely productive week spent discussing wargaming and analytical methodologies with colleagues from the Defence and Security Analysis Division of the UK Ministry Defence Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at their Portsdown West site. I’ll post a trip report as soon as my comments and the photos are cleared for public release.

In the meantime, PAXsims is pleased to present some recent items on conflict simulation and serious (and not-so-serious) gaming that may be of interest to our readers. Ryan Kuhns contributed material for this latest edition.

PAXsims

jdn1_16In May, the Pentagon released Joint Doctrine Note 1-16 on the topic of Command Red Team:

Command red teams help commanders and staffs think critically and creatively; challenge assumptions; mitigate groupthink; reduce risks by serving as a check against complacency and surprise; and increase opportunities by helping the staff see situations, problems, and potential solutions from alternative perspectives.

The distinguishing feature of a command red team from alternative analysis produced by subject matter experts within the intelligence directorate of a joint staff is its relative independence, which isolates it from the organizational influences that can unintentionally shape intelligence analysis, such as the human tendency for analysts to maintain amicable relations with colleagues and supervisors, and the potential for regular coordination processes to normalize divergent assessments. Commanders can seek the perspectives of trusted advisors regarding any issue of concern. A command red team may also address similar issues, but unlike most commander’s advisory/action groups, it supports the commander’s staff throughout the design, planning, execution, and assessment of operations, and during routine problem-solving initiatives throughout the headquarters. Red teams and tiger teams may be ad hoc and address specific issues. In many cases, the only difference between the two may be the participation of a red team member who can advise the group in the use of structured techniques. Alternate modes employ red teaming as a temporary or additional duty or as an ad hoc operation, with teams assembled as needed to address specific issues.

JDN 1-16 goes on to address Red Team organization, challenges, and activities, as well as their contribution to joint planning and joint intelligence. The appendices include a list of common logical fallacies and tips for effective devil’s advocacy.

 

PAXsims

Wikistrat-A-Chinese-Spring-cover-464x600Shay Hershkovitz, Chief Strategy Officer and Director of the Analytical Community at Wikistrat, has passed on a recent report on how China might deal with future unrest.

Wikistrat generally uses online expert crowd-sourcing to explore scenarios and identify drivers and pathways. In this case, the simulation methodology was as follows:

50 analysts were handpicked from Wikistrat’s global community of more than 2,000 to participate in this simulation, including renowned China experts Andrew K.P. Leung, Hong Kong’s former chief representative to the United Kingdom; Professor Yawei Liu, Director of the Carter Center’s China Program; and Hugh Stephens, Executive-in-Residence at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

The participants were divided into four mirror-image teams (all playing as the Politburo) to test whether they would manage the crisis differently. The game progressed across four rounds, each representing a week of real time. The teams were given the same scenario at the start, but conditions were adjusted in subsequent rounds to re ect the actions of each team.

Every participant could propose an action by submitting a “move” containing a policy decision (e.g., suppress online discussion of the protests), a desired end-state and a rationale. The rest of the team expressed their approval by “liking” the proposal (or disapproval by taking no action). Whichever proposal received the most likes in a given round was interpreted by Wikistrat as the team’s consensus and informed the next round’s update.

119 moves were proposed by the teams in total. There was often a clear preference for one or two moves per round in each team. In only a few cases did Wikistrat need to consolidate various moves that received an equal number of likes.

A fifth group of experts was engaged as a U.S. observer team to offer insights into how the United States might interpret and respond to China’s actions.

In the end, the four China teams proceeded more or less along the same pathways, seeking to quell the protests by cracking down on ringleaders while offering concessions and conjuring up foreign plots in order to demotivate the masses.

You’ll find a description of each round of the simulation and key take-aways in the full report (link above).

ChineseSpring3

PAXsims

A modified version of the digital game Civilization V is being developed for use in high school classrooms. According to The Verge:

 Publisher Take-Two Interactive announced that a modified version of the historical strategy game Civilization V is in the works, and is expected to be available for high school classes in North America starting next fall. Called CivilizationEDU, the company says that the education-focused version of the game will “provide students with the opportunity to think critically and create historical events, consider and evaluate the geographical ramifications of their economic and technological decisions, and to engage in systems thinking and experiment with the causal / correlative relationships between military, technology, political, and socioeconomic development.”

While I enjoy Civ V and other 4X (“eXplore, eXpand, eXploit, and eXterminate”) games, I’m a little doubtful that they are the best way of teaching about world history since they tend to be designed to reflect player preferences, expectations, and preconceptions rather than portray accurate historical dynamics.

PAXsims

…and on that subject, it’s about time we offered a shout-out to Play the Past, a website “dedicated to thoughtfully exploring and discussing the intersection of cultural heritage (very broadly defined) and games/meaningful play (equally broadly defined).”

PAXsims

Brexit.jpg

At the Active Learning in Political Science blog they discuss simulating Brexit:

In the spirit of not wasting a good crisis, the UK’s decision to leave the European Union offers a great way into understanding a number of political dynamics.

Of course, we need to tread a bit carefully here, for a number of reasons. Firstly, this is a highly fluid situation, so whatever one might plan for the autumn might be completely overtaken by events. Secondly, some of the things that have happened over the past week are so extreme and atypical that while you might reproduce them in a simulation setting, you are almost certainly never going to see them happen again. Thirdly, there’s an awful lot going on, so you need to pick your targets clearly.

With all those caveats in mind, some options still present themselves….

PAXsims

460003main_merraflood93.jpgOn 20-21 October 2016, the Digital Culture Unit at Goldsmiths, University of London will be hosting a conference on Simulation and Environments: A Critical Dialogue Between Systems Of Perception And Ecocritical Aesthetics.

Theme #1: Aesthetics and Environmental Simulations

When addressing issues of climate and climate crisis, simulation models and techniques become potent tools for understanding, prediction, and prevention. Yet the epistemological merit of these tools is rarely accompanied with a critical assessment of their aesthetic properties.

Put another way, the history of nature and the environment is, particularly at its interstices with the human and the natural sciences, heavily laden with cultural and even theological ideas about how a nature should look, should make one feel, should be. What guarantee do we have that these ideological preconceptions are not making their way into our simulations and models? If they are being included, how are they influencing our data? Or conversely, should we be including the cultural and affective effects of nature so often associated with the experience of landscape into our computational models precisely because of the way they fold the human into the physical environment?

The aim of this conference stream will be to parse the aesthetic conditions of simulation technologies, assumptions, and ideologies when dealing with the ecosystem. What role can visual or other aesthetics play in the computing of climates and natural phenomena? How does the changing role of the human as geological agent reframe the digital image as an epistemological form?

Proposed essays may touch on one of the following subjects, but are not restricted to including these:

  • Geospatial technologies, imaging, & observational data
  • Earth imaging & observation
  • Computational climate models
  • Military vision and targeting technologies
  • GIS technologies
  • Remote sensing
  • New media art

 

Theme #2: Simulation and Systems of Perception

Conceptions of simulation attempt to recreate the environment through computational logics of representation that only ever remain asymptotic to the physical world. Rather than asking whether or not simulation can ever provide homeomorphic images of the physical how can simulation instead be used performatively to rethink ways of perceiving, knowing and doing?

This might entail a theorisation of vision – or visioning – in the broader sense of not just perceiving with sight, but also insight, as well as the projection of images of elsewheres and otherwises, futures and fantasies. How would such a repositioning affect the potential instrumentalisation of simulation for political imaginaries and art practices?

The aim of this conference stream will be to invite discussion on the ontological and epistemological implications of simulated modes of perception. How can perception be understood in relation to computational aesthetics and logics?

Proposed essays may touch on one of the following subjects, but are not restricted to including these:

  • Computational modelling systems
  • Mathematics and culture
  • Planning technologies and the imaginary
  • Artificial visioning systems
  • Geopositioning and robotics
  • Cognitive simulations

Those interested in participating should  submit paper abstracts of 500 words to environmentalsims@gmail.com by 1 August 2016. (Please designate theme of interest).

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