Ms Leong rightly points out that there is a lack of a clear glidepath for prospective entrants into the professional wargaming field. The idea of ‘dumb luck’playing an overarching role in the identification, selection, and development of wargamers is, quite frankly, silly, especially for an undertaking of such significance in the national security space. And yet, here we are, after decades of knowing the value of professional wargaming, still just muddling along and happy when we find a good success story like hers.
What’s wrong with us? (OK, let’s be honest, we don’t have that much time.)
What’s wrong with us that we can’t figure out a better process for identifying and developing aspiring professional wargamers, and alter the ‘inverted pyramid‘ to something both less-inverted, and less-pyramid-y? And maybe shake up the color scheme and the gender combination while we’re at it.
Well, frankly, one significant thing wrong with us is, well… us.
At the Atlantic Council blog, the issue of wargaming cybersecurity and statecraft is discussed by five experts: Maria-Kristina Hayden (global head of cyber wargames & awareness, The Bank of New York Mellon), Andreas Haggman (cyber security skills policy lead, UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport), Nina Kollars (nonresident fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative; associate professor of the Strategic and Operational Research Department and core faculty member, Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute, Naval War College), Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; nonresident fellow, Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute, Naval War College), and John Watts (senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security).
In his July 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Gen David H. Berger placed special emphasis on increasing the Corps’ wargaming capability, noting that it is “essential to charting our course in an era of strategic fluidity and rapid change.” “Our problem,” he observed, “is not that we are not doing wargaming … but that we have not effectively harnessed this ef- fort into an integrated process of learning.” In response, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (CSC) has spent the past academic year inte- grating competitive wargaming into all aspects of the curriculum.
COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on U.S. military recruiting. In March 2020, the Army shuttered its recruiting stations across the country, moving all efforts online. Since then, the Army has resumed in-person recruiting, but with added restrictions and in low-risk areas only. The Navy, Air Force, and Marines have also closed many of their recruiting offices. Recent epidemiological models and medical experts suggest that the U.S. will grapple with COVID-19 for the next 12-18 months, until there is a widely-available vaccine. Other experts, however, find that estimate far too optimistic. For the near future, recruiters must severely limit close contact with prospective recruits. All of the services, therefore, have made digital recruiting their main focus. And although the Army was down 5,500 recruiting contracts in April, it appears to have had significant success with its efforts in—wait for it—video games. Indeed, Army leaders claim that games have generated “a ton of leads.” The Navy and Air Force have also embraced digital games as recruiting tools. The Marine Corps, however, has not.
The Corps has been hit hard by the pandemic, due to losing out on its traditional emphasis on “kneecap-to kneecap” recruiting pitches. Recent science and marketing research support the use of games as recruiting tools, and the Marine Corps should embrace them in the short term, looking to the other services’ gaming strategies as useful models. The Marine Corps should take the opportunity of pandemic-disrupted recruiting procedures to rethink and retool its strategic recruiting plan to better adapt to long-term shifts in American society.
Two years ago, much of the professional military education community was startled by the National Defense Strategy’s declaration that its wares had stagnated and that the community had lost focus on lethality and ingenuity. This month, the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded with a new vision and guidance statement for professional military education: Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War. As the document is signed by each service chief, it neatly erases tensions between what the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body believe is necessary to educate officers capable of leading in a joint environment and each individual chief’s responsibility to educate officers within their own services. Most crucially, the new vision signals that the services are “all in” on the need to reform professional military education.
Take a moment to consider the implications of this “buy-in.”
The Joint Chiefs are not only agreeing that professional military education has stagnated but also boldly stating the system is not currently optimized to give them what they need to win future wars. In perusing the document, it becomes clear that the Joint Chiefs are casting almost all the blame for this failure at senior-level professional military education. This valuation is probably an on-target assessment, as — for over seven decades — the U.S. military has won nearly every tactical battle it has fought without translating this battlefield acumen into the strategic results desired by policymakers.