PAXsims

Conflict simulation, peacebuilding, and development

Monthly Archives: January 2019

CNA Talks: How to make a wargame

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The latest edition of CNA’s podcast series features Jeremy Sepinsky discussing “how to make a wargame.”

In part one of our occasional series on wargaming, Don Boroughs sits down with CNA’s lead wargame designer Jeremy Sepinsky to discuss what it takes to create a CNA wargame. Jeremy describes CNA’s games as bespoke, informed, immersive and diverse, designed to solve very specific analytical problems. To illustrate this, Jeremy talks Don though a hypothetical wargame designed to determine whether the military should invest in an airborne laser. If you enjoy this episode, keep an eye out for part two of our series, in which Don and Jeremy will discuss what it’s like to play in a CNA wargame.

If you are interested in learning more about CNA wargaming program, please contact Jeremy Sepinsky at sepinskyj@cna.org. Go to www.cna.org/CNAtalks to learn more about the participants and listen to more CNA Talks episodes.

AFTERSHOCK “Deal of the Day” at The Game Crafter

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AFTERSHOCK: A Humanitarian Crisis Game is currently the “Deal of the Day” at The Game Crafter. You have only a few more hours to get it at 12% off the regular price!

KWN: Yuna Wong livestream today

The King’s Wargaming Network reminds us that Yuna Wong’s lecture on “Developing an Academic Discipline of Wargaming: Pathways, Possibilities and Pitfalls” will be live streamed today (16 January 2019) via YouTube.
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Lin-Greenberg: Drones, escalation, and experimental wargames

 

WoTRdrones.pngAt War on the Rocks, Erik Lin-Greenberg discusses what a series of experimental wargames reveal about drones and escalation risk. The finding: the loss of unmanned platforms presents less risk of escalation.

I developed an innovative approach to explore these dynamics: the experimental wargame. The method allows observers to compare nearly identical, simultaneous wargames — a set of control games, in which a factor of interest does not appear, and a set of treatment games, in which it does. In my experiment, all participants are exposed to the same aircraft shootdown scenario, but participants in treatment games are told the downed aircraft is a drone while those in control games are told it is manned. This allows policymakers to examine whether drones affect decision-making.

The experimental wargames revealed that the deployment of drones can actually contribute to lowerlevels of escalation and greater crisis stability than the deployment of manned assets. These findings help explain how drones affect stability by shedding light on escalation dynamics after an initial drone deployment, something that few existing studies on drones have addressed.

My findings build upon existing research on the low barrier to drone deployment by suggesting that, once conflict has begun, states may find drones useful for limiting escalation. Indeed, states can take action using or against drones without risking significant escalation. The results should ease concerns of drone pessimists and offer valuable insights to policymakers about drones’ effects on conflict dynamics. More broadly, experimental wargaming offers a novel approach to generating insights about national security decision-making that can be used to inform military planning and policy development.

You will find a longer and more detailed account of the study here.

This is a good example of using multiple wargames as an experimental method. Above and beyond this, it also shows how that wargames can generate questions worthy of further investigation.

More specifically, while the loss of a drone is less escalatory, an actor might be more likely to introduce a drone for this reason—possibly deploying one in a situation where they would not have risked a manned platform. If this is true, however, drones may still prove more escalatory overall. In other words, if the wargame is expanded to include the prior decision to deploy assets in the first place, the actual outcome might have been something like this:

  • Blue scenario 1: Deploy manned platform?
    • No, too risky.
    • No platform deployed.
    • Nothing shot down.
    • Result: No escalation.
  • Blue scenario 2: Deploy drone?
    • Yes, because no pilot at risk.
    • Drone shot down.
    • Result: Minor escalation.

Or, with regard to another situation—perhaps local air defences would have been reluctant to engage a manned aircraft because of the evident risk of escalation, but would happily shoot down a drone. In this case the experimental findings might have been:

  • Red scenario 1: Shoot down aircraft?
    • No, too risky.
    • Nothing shot down.
    • Result: No escalation.
  • Red scenario 2: Shoot down drone?
    • Yes, because no pilot at risk.
    • Drone shot down.
    • Result: Minor escalation.

In fact, if you read the full paper you will see this is exactly what occurred in a scenario involving a  shoot-down decision: participants were much more likely to use force against an unmanned drone.

In other words, while the study suggests that drones might reduce the chance of escalation, it also suggests that we also need to investigate whether the lower perceived risk of drone-related escalation might cause Blue to undertake more provocative overflights, or might lead Red to undertake more potentially escalatory shoot-downs.

Figure 1 below shows the main experiment: aircraft shoot-downs lead to major escalations, drone shoot-downs to minor escalation.

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Figure 1: Experimental results suggest shoot-down of manned aircraft results in greater escalation.

Given the risk of escalation, however, decision-makers might decide against overflight in the first place.

Figure 2 examines a situation where no drones are available. It incorporates the possibility that decision-makers simply refrain from overflight because of the escalation risk, and assigns a (plausible but entirely made-up) probability to this. Moreover, knowing that a shoot-down of a manned aircraft is likely to cause escalation—a tendency noted by Lin-Greenberg’s other experiment—perhaps Red won’t actually open fire. Again, I have assigned a (plausible) probability to this. These numbers are just for the purposes of illustration, but here we note that with manned overflight as the only option there is a 16% chance of escalation.

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Figure 2: Considering other decision points. Should Blue even send an aircraft, given risk of escalation? Should Red engage it, given the risks?

In this fuller model, now let us introduce drones (Figure 3). Given that they are less likely to cause escalation, let us assume that (1) Blue is likely to prefer them over a manned ISR platform, (as per earlier findings) (2) Red is more likely to shoot them down, and that (3) shooting down a drone causes minor rather than major escalation. Once again, I’ve assigned some plausible probabilities for the purposes of illustration.

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Figure: Adding drones to the mix.

When we add drones into the mix, the risk of major escalation drops from 16% to 4%, but, the risk of some form of escalation actually increases to 60%.  Does this mean that drones have actually limited the risk of escalation, or increased it? Moreover, it is possible that tit-for-tat minor escalation over drone shoot-downs could grow over time to major escalation. If that were the case, it is possible that drones—rather than limiting conflict—are a sort of easy-to-use “gateway drug” to more serious problems.

Remember that I’ve essentially invented all of my probabilities to make a methodological point (although I have tried to make them plausible). My point here is not in any way to criticize Lin-Greenberg’s experimental findings—I suspect he is right. It is to say that the two sets of wargame experiments he undertook are useful not only for their immediate findings, but also to the extent that they generate additional questions to be investigated.

 

 

Rubel: Gaming the interface between strategy and operations

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At the Center for International Maritime Security website, Robert “Barney” Rubel is offering his thoughts on gaming the interface between strategy and operations:

Wargaming is ubiquitous throughout the U.S. Armed Forces as a tool for research, education, training, and influence. It is a flexible tool, adaptable to different scenarios, purposes, and levels of war. It is in this last arena, levels of war, that gaming organizations and their sponsors can bump up against the limits of wargaming.

The inherent nature of wargaming requires delineation and focus in game objectives and design. A game to address all three levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical, is simply not feasible, requiring too many players, too much money, and too much time. The normal approach is to pick a level of war to play, with the other levels being either scripted, managed by the control cell, or ignored altogether. Even when a game is designed to incorporate free play at two levels, some kind of pruning of factors – frequently time – must occur to make the game feasible within budget and schedule constraints. The net result is that a robust exploration of the relationships among the levels of war becomes a casualty, missing in action.

Among the consequences of this gap in gaming could be a failure of communication and coordination among policy, strategy, and operational decision-makers, such as occurred in Vietnam and Iraq. This series will discuss the nature of this gaming gap and will offer some suggestions for closing it.

In Part 1 he discusses the problematic nature of the gap in policy-making and military operations. In Part 2, he focuses on combining strategy and operations in wargames:

It is often the case that scenarios for operational-level wargames include a “road-to-war” section that offers a plausible narrative of how the crisis or an attack that starts the game came about. As routinely as such narratives are produced, their influence on the game tends to wane as the game proceeds. Players and umpires become immersed in operational moves and counter-moves. Moreover, the road-to-war narrative may lack sufficient discussion of factors that would be needed to power analyses or move assessments farther downstream in the game. The bottom line is that unless a game is designed such that it includes specific measures to examine the matter, the strategy/operations interface gets short shrift in current gaming practice.

Of course, no plan survives contact with the enemy, so inevitably, once a war starts, a strategy/operations feedback loop of some sort must be established. Such loops automatically raise the issue of the degree to which operations are subject to detailed management from Washington. In some cases, such as Vietnam, operations such as air strikes into North Vietnam were micromanaged from the White House. In others, such as Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf went into cease fire negotiations with little in the way of guidance from the president. In between those extremes are any number of cases, such as Lincoln and Grant, in which we find a good balance of delegation and oversight.

At this point it should be mentioned that each level of war contains its own logic and its own set of imperatives. The fundamental purpose of each higher command echelon is to coordinate and support the staffs and units that report to it. However, there is also the inherent requirement for higher echelons to override or sub-optimize the logic of lower echelon operations. If tactical victory was all that mattered, operational-level staffs would not have to worry about harmonizing strategy and tactics and could only focus on coordinating the tactical units below them. Similarly, if operational logic governed things once war broke out – a view that was widely held in earlier times – then political oversight would be unnecessary and likely counter-productive. The point is that there frequently arises occasions in which higher commands must impose guidance on lower level forces that exposes them to higher risk or reins them in somehow in order to protect or achieve higher level objectives.

 

Dstl needs you!

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…well, they do if you’re a UK national with expertise in wargaming.

The UK MOD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory is looking for five people to join their wargaming team:

  1. 1614750 Wargame & Computer Simulation Analyst(x2)
  2. 1614762 Senior Wargaming Analyst(x1)
  3. 1614765 Wargaming Analyst(x1)
  4. 1614740 Principal Historical Analyst(x1)

These job opportunities are open to UK nationals onlyand are not open to candidates who hold a dual nationality. The closing date for applications is Sunday, January 20.

Details at the links above. For more on what the Dstl wargaming team does, see this and this and this and this and this. You may even get a Dstl Portsdown West wargaming mug out of it!

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Jensen: Wargaming the Future

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At War on the Rocks this week there is an excellent piece by Benjamin Jensen entitled “Welcome to Fight Club: Wargaming the Future” in which he explores the use of competitive wargaming to explore the impact of new technologies and capabilities on the battlefield.

…since 2015 the Marine Corps University and Marine Corps Warfighting Lab have used a special series of wargames to reimagine amphibious operations for the 21st century. In this initiative, dubbed “Fight Club,” students from the Command and Staff College work with groups ranging from DARPA to the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the Potomac Institute to stress-test capstone Marine Corps concepts associated with amphibious operations. The results of these games have produced four major lessons-learned studies on topics like manned-unmanned teaming and narrow artificial intelligence applications.

Fight Club splits the students into competing sides and asks the groups to develop a plan and fight against each other in multiple iterations, including redoing the exercise as a controlled experiment by adding a new capability or concept. For example, one team might try an amphibious assault with current force structure and equipment and then retry it with future capabilities, such as the use of swarms to reduce risk and compound shock and dislocation. Having military professionals fight each other in secure environments and allowing for controlled excursions allows them to imagine future war and think through the concepts, capabilities, and organizations required to maintain a competitive edge.

There are four aspects of Fight Club that make it unique. First, all games are competitive and involve teams fighting other teams. There is a big difference between fighting an algorithm or scenario and fighting another human being. Fighting other people highlights fog, friction, uncertainty, and how new technologies risk compounding their effects.

Second, the games are designed using social science methods to analyze the difference between control and treatment groups. That is, participants start with a baseline game that involves current capabilities, and then another group fights with new capabilities. This allows the designers to assess the utility of new concepts and capabilities like manned-unmanned, teaming, deception, and various technologies associated with swarming.

Third, unlike many large Department of Defense wargames, the participants in Fight Club are top officers with recent operational experience. Instead of combing the Pentagon to find random bodies or relying solely on retired officers-turned-contractors, the effort targets field-grade officers in professional military education programs or military fellowships.

Fourth, the games involve creative combinations of seminar-style and computer-based adjudication methods. Through seminar-style components, wargame designers capture participants’ novel ideas and insights. Through low-cost but high-fidelity computer-based adjudication, including the Joint Warfare Adjudication Model developed by the Center for Army Analysis and commercial games, the game designers generate the data they need to better analyze the results, test assumptions, and rerun portions of the game.

It’s a very useful account of how competitive and repetitive gaming can be used to generate potential insight. Of course, one cannot draw any firm conclusions with an experiment where n=1 or n=2 (that is, a small number of games for any one set of experimental conditions), but one can generate questions and issues that deserve further thinking about and investigation. Good wargaming, after all, is about the cycle of research, and can be a useful part of triangulation in mixed-methods analysis.

Serious Games Forum 2018 conference report

This report is written by PAXsims research associate Juliette Le Ménahèze. All pictures are courtesy of the Serious Games Network.


 

image.pngThe first edition of the Serious Games Forum was held on 3 December 2018 in Paris. The event was hosted at the War College (École Militaire) by the Serious Games Network (SGN) – France, and supported by a number of associations. The event was attended by 200 people, and counted no less than 30 speakers and workshop facilitators.

The morning was dedicated to conference panels, organized around two themes: a first general panel on wargaming, and a second focusing on the benefits of wargaming for business.

First, Patrick Ruetschmann (SGN President and the Forum’s main organizer) welcomed everyone and explained how the day was to unfold.

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General reflections on wargaming

Historian and wargame designer Pierre Razoux spoke on the use of wargaming at the War College strategic research institute (Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire – IRSEM), where he leads the “regional questions – North” research cluster. IRSEM distinguishes itself from other French think-tanks by resorting extensively to wargaming, which still lacks recognition and is seldom used in France.

Professor Philip Sabin then explained the reasons why King’s College London, where he teaches wargaming, is establishing a Wargaming Network (WN). The aim of the WN, which he co-directs with Ms Ivanka Barzashka and for which the inaugural lecture was held the day following the conference, endeavours to advance wargaming as a tool for innovation and education to address current security challenges. King’s has a rich history of wargaming, and through the WN they seek to further still their position as a hub for the growing community of students and staff studying and applying wargames. He discussed the importance of wargaming as an active learning tool for King’s students, who through playing and designing wargames further their understanding of conflict dynamics. Moreover, there is a growing understanding in the defence community that wargaming is a powerful tool, by providing a ‘safe fail’ environment.

Colonel Christophe de Lajudie offered his perspective on whether or not we should refuse digital wargaming. Unfortunately I was not able to attend this talk.

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Wargaming for business

Dr Sara Ulrich spoke of business wargaming, especially in the context of Deloitte crisis management. She is a Director of Deloitte’s UK Crisis Management & Resilience practice leading Contingency Planning for Strategic Risks (Brexit currently) and also Scenario Planning, Simulations and Wargaming.

According to her, business wargaming has capability in four areas:

  • Future preparedness wargames: they allow the company to explore its potential future and get a better understanding of the unknown
  • Issues & crisis preparedness simulations and wargames: they are designed to support a company’s high impact events, issues or crisis plans preparedness.
  • Learning & training wargames: they are designed to help practice and rehearse skills and understand others’ (clients, competitors, regulators, etc.) perspectives
  • Key decisions business wargames: they are designed to support a company’s planning, testing or stress testing of key decisions or important challenges.

Then she explained that Deloitte organizes its wargames in the following way: the client team is faced with the red teams, comprising competitors, as well as the market and regulators, and the control team.

She offered a few examples of wargames organized at Deloitte: three for clients, and an internal wargame for Deloitte’s senior managers.

  • “Global pharma companies wargame workshop” organized for a drug launch
    • Two global pharma companies formed a partnership to co-launch a new drug in two regions. The drug was undergoing phase 3 clinical trials with the results expected to be published soon. The drug was set to launch in two regions. The biggest concern was that the outcome of the clinical trial could demonstrate that the new treatment is no better than current drugs already on the market. The client engaged Deloitte to help assess the potential impacts of various trial results (phase 1, the wargame itself), and to develop a detailed mitigation plan (phase 2). The two “maximum change” scenarios were explored.
  • “Broadband company full market business wargame” to predict competitors’ moves
    • This client was facing an increasingly competitive environment as the ecosystem, regulatory and market landscape continues to evolve. They thus engaged Deloitte to run a 2-day wargame to bring to life the competitive market.
    • Day 1 focused on 2017-2018: Increased fixed line competition and threats of substitution to 4G wireless products and Wi-Fi offerings. During the debriefing session they identified the possibility of a market shock: two competitors may merge due to pressure on growth.
    • Day 2 focused on the future period 2019-2023. It started in the following way: Increased demand for higher broadband speeds due to advancements in technology and looming 5G release poses a substitution threat. Relying on the precedent day’s debriefing findings, they also introduced a market shock, with a new player entry. The debriefing session identified the key threats for this client, what the response strategies should be, relying on the consultant’s’ expertise and on participant reflections. Finally, they were able to detail an action plan.
  • “Negotiation skills business wargame for Deloitte University”
    • The 1-day game was organized for Deloitte Senior Manager level participants with aim to enhance their negotiations skills. The war game used a negotiation model which is based on the Harvard model of negotiation, and involved role-played negotiation meetings. War game materials were pushed to participant teams through an online platform, which drove the wargame and replicated real life decision making. Teams were scored on tasks through the platform, and on face-to-face meetings. These scores were aligned to the negotiation framework for in-day feedback.
  • “Major oil company business wargame” for a future joint venture
    • A major oil company engaged Deloitte to develop a Joint-Venture wargame event in order to bring typical JV risks and challenges to life. The event was themed around “Back to the Future”, taking participants from 2030 to 2016, with a focus on a different JV challenge at each move. Dynamic injects such as newspaper articles, voiceovers and holograms were delivered over the course of the day using Greenhouse technology.
    • The six client participants were divided in two: three focused on the downstream and the three others focused on the upstream. They had to prepare strategic JV responses to scenarios sent by the control team, who would constantly introduce updates and material. Additionally, a team of experts was present to input advice when requested, and role play different stakeholders. They were instrumental in providing key insights during the debriefing session.

I tremendously enjoyed this talk, because it was very practical and detail-oriented. It provided a fresh and dynamic outlook on wargaming and I believe it provided participants with a clear idea of how they could use wargames for their own business needs.

Major Tom Mouat then spoke of what business can learn from wargaming. He started with a reminder for all the participants of what wargaming is about. First wargaming is a great training, and training is about making us better at what we already know, but also about understanding ourselves and making ourselves better. Moreover wargaming is about shared understanding and imagination, competition and adversarial thinking, and understanding victory and learning from defeat. He particularly emphasized that last point.

Tom Mouat then quoted Thomas C Shelling: “The one thing you cannot do… is to make a list of things you never thought of”. That is counterable through wargames. He also reminded us that after the treaty of Versailles was signed, the German army was deprived of a proper army and their actual military exercises were limited. They thus resorted to wargames for training, with a terrible efficacy.

A major danger in the military and the business world alike, is the phenomena of groupthink, in part induced by a rigid hierarchy that makes it hard for lower level officials/ employees to questions their superior’s decisions. It leads to imitation based on previous decisions and limits the possibilities for innovation, reinterpretation, and so on.

To groupthink he opposed the wisdom of crowds. Groups can be better at estimation than individuals. Groups indeed bring a diversity of opinion, decentralized expertise and independence of thought. This advantage is nullified if formal hierarchy is maintained among group members. Another point to consider is that best predictions come from conflict or contest.

He also discussed the usefulness of roleplay in predicting outcomes: one study found that rolepays had a 62% chance of accurately predicting outcomes, far better than a single expert (31% correct) or a game theory (32% correct).

Moving on to business, he identified business benefits from wargaming: analysis of competitor, customer and supplier behavior; new product introductions, market entry scenarios, or development of new businesses; impact of changes in market environment; and simulation of negotiations.

Finally, Tom Mouat reminded us that wargaming isn’t about the “game” (which business people who are not familiar with the practice fail to understand)” Wargaming is about practice, an attitude of mind, getting input from everyone, in an organisation that values innovation, with the goal of exploring ways to make the “other guy” fail, and above all gaining a clear understanding of “what do we want to achieve?”.

Walter Vejdovsky, head of group M&As at Capgemini, discussed the benefits of wargaming for one’s organization. He opened his talk with a quote illustrating the benefits of wargaming: “I hear and I forget, I see and I remember, I do and I understand” (Confucius).

He identified the major common traits of the military and business:

  • a pyramidal command structure (whether explicit or implicit in the case of businesses)
  • Limited intelligence on the enemy or the competitors, and internal intelligence/ reporting bias
  • Friction and uncertainty
  • Competition
  • The human factor: the morale is key, and stress, emotions and commitment of any decisions (although businesses face lesser risks)
  • Multidimensional goals: in the military, victory is determined with a mix of losses, geographical control and political factors; in business, the “value” of a corporation involves numerous factors.

Lunch followed, and the major part of the afternoon was dedicated to the game fair, divided in 6 workshops: (1) contemporary games (2) conceive games (3) cybersecurity (4) humanitarian and civil security (5) use for formation (6) history of wargaming.

Each workshop was run twice in the afternoon and comprised of one or two introductory talks, followed by a couple simultaneous games. Running Rex Brynen’s AFTERSHOCK humanitarian crisis game, I unfortunately did not get the occasion to explore the other workshops and games.

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image.pngIn the humanitarian and civil security workshop, Russell King spoke (in French!) of his experience in emergency planning at the British National Health Service (NHS), its crucial importance, and how simulations can lead to positive planning improvements.

Dr Sophie Cros (Panthéon-Sorbonne) then spoke of an experiment she ran with policemen and firemen after three days of formation to crisis management. She ran one realistic and one unrealistic crisis simulation. She noted that the unrealistic simulation had generated a lot of stress among participants, whereas the other did not. When put under stress, individuals showed that they did not completely assimilate what they had learned during the 3-day workshop. The unrealistic, stress-inducing simulation was thus best fitted to spot potential shortcomings of individuals’ trainings.

After the talks the games could take place. I was supposed to run two sessions of AFTERSHOCK but could only run the first one for I was short on participants during the second session. Participants seemed to enjoy the first session, and during the second session I instead explained the game and its uses to a few people who approached me and seemed very interested, be they students, humanitarian personnel, or military personnel. They expressed the wish to see a French version of the game published. (A French translation of the rules and player aids is, however, available on BoardGameGeek.) 

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The last part of the afternoon was dedicated to the results of a hackathon ran jointly by Sciences Po and the French Red Cross. Three teams of Sciences Po students thus presented the game they had designed in just a few weeks for the Red Cross, on the theme of International Humanitarian Law.

The first team had designed an app-supported cyber security wargame, loosely modelled on battleship. The red team tries to find the position of the blue team’s security system and attack it. Both players have to answer cyber security-related questions on the app in order to advance or block the adversary.

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The second team had designed an app-supported game as well, which was semi-collaborative as each player had its own agenda while working towards a common goal for the Red Cross, and one player could even be a secret enemy. The scenarios, agendas of the protagonists, but also the number of turns were randomly generated by the app, making it highly replayable.

The third team had designed a boardgame modeling an emergency issue in a fictive city plagued by civil war between two groups. The game thus comprised three players, The Red Cross and the two fighting groups. Each fighting group had the objective of taking control of the city (seizing the city hall being the main objective), while the Red Cross’ objective was essentially to save as much of the city’s population as possible.

All these games seemed very well designed and enjoyable, and I was truly impressed with what they had managed to achieve in just a few weeks.

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Following that, Tom Mouat, Pierre Razoux, Patrick Ruestchmann, Eric Jacopin and a Red Cross representative took questions from the audience. Finally, it fell to General Carmona, vice-director of the Institute for Higher National Defence Studies (Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, IHEDN), to make a few concluding comments on the conference.

Overall, it was a very productive and stimulating day. As a French national, I must say I was particularly happy to witness the first French edition of a Connections-like conference, and proud of what had been achieved. I want to salute Patrick Ruetschmann’s hard work in putting together such an event practically on his own. The participants too were very dynamic and passionate about their subject.

Moreover, I was impressed and extremely satisfied with the greater gender-parity and proportion of young people compared with other wargaming events I had had the chance to attend in the past. The collaboration between Sciences Po and the Red Cross, and the partnership with a master’s program partly taught at the War College itself were decisive in increasing the number of young participants. I particularly appreciated that Sciences Po students were able to present their games. It sent a strong signal that the young were able to produce smart, fun and instructive wargames.

I hope to see more of this in the 2019 edition, that promises to be more ambitious with at least two days of conference.

Juliette Le Ménahèze 

2018 in review

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Happy 2019, everyone! With a new year upon us, it is a good time to review the past year at PAXsims.

First off, we are happy to report that we had our most successful year yet, with some 60,127 visitors and 119,628 page views. That brings us up to a total of 702,535 views since the project was launched ten years ago in January 2009.

The largest share of our views continue to come from the United States (46%), UK (12%), and Canada (9%). However, viewers from China now comprise a larger and larger share, now representing the fifth largest group of visitors. All told we had visitors from 179 different countries and territories, including East Timor and Chad.

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We had 119 posts on the website in 2018. The post popular posts from the past year were our recent review of the iOS game Rebel Inc, MAJ Cole Peterson’s account of the Sea Dragon wargaming competition at Marine Corps University, our report on the WATU wargame, an overview of Dstl’s STRIKE! battlegroup tactical wargame, and the PAXsims report on the Connections UK 2018 professional wargaming conference. Our all-time most popular piece is on the wargaming Wrens of the Western Approaches Tactical Unit, as well as our resource pages on AFTERSHOCK and the Matrix Game Construction Kit.

Brian Train remains our most prolific commenter on posts, and hence is once again recipient of the annual Golden PAXsim award.

 

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