Teaching international relations through popular games, culture and simulations (Part 1)

PAXsims is pleased to feature the first of five blog posts from David Romano (Missouri State University) on teaching International Relations through popular games, culture and simulations. Today he introduces the topic—after that,  you can read parts two, three, four, and five.

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Introduction

Politics as “the struggle for power” surrounds us. We deal with international relations (IR) theory explicitly in courses and publications on the topic, of course. IR theories also implicitly pervade our lives in other ways, however – through games such as RISK and Civilization, popular culture such as Star Trek and Game of Thrones and, of course, simulations. Popular games, films and books can help students understand key concepts of international relations in new ways, deepening their understanding of the material. Recognizing this, the discipline has begun increasingly to discuss more ways to incorporate these kinds of things into IR pedagogy.

Games like RISK, Diplomacy, Civilization and others can be viewed as models. Like all models, they simplify the world and focus on certain relational and structural issues while downplaying others–making them perfect for simpler introductory courses, where the aim is the familiarize students with the basics of international relations as quickly as possible. Popular fantasy and science fiction can also prove particularly useful for getting students to think about levels of analysis and the assumptions we rely upon in IR without getting distracted by cultural stereotypes or political affinities.

This series of blog posts will lay out various ways to adapt these “models” to the IR classroom through experiential learning. Simulations and experiential learning have many proponents in the field (Dorn, 1989; Brock and Cameron 1999; Shellman 2001; Endersby & Shaw, 2009; Loggins, 2009), of course, but detractors (Mandel 1987) criticize the amount of class time they often require and question the extent to which they contribute to students’ understanding of the material. Rather than attempt to resolve such a debate, the discussion here treats simulations, games and popular culture as an add-on to more orthodox pedagogy. All the assignments described here thus include the caveats that they must not require much in the way of class time or large amounts of professors’ time to manage. The principle at work centers on the belief that different people learn in different ways. For students who require more active involvement, creativity and imagination in their learning process, popular culture and games can fill a sometimes substantial gap in the teaching of international relations. Based on assignments I developed for my international relations theory classes over the years, as well as an experimental course focused entirely on IR theory through games, simulations and popular culture that I taught in 2013, the unifying principle is to teach students about international relations theories via the often neglected “right side of the brain.”

While Realist and Neo-Realist IR paradigms and related theories have a plethora of suitable games and pop culture items to rely upon, finding pedagogic “right brain” material to engage with other paradigms and approaches proved a bit more challenging but by no means impossible. While the overview presented here does not intend to provide an exhaustive treatment of available models, simulations, paradigms and theories, it does go over the basic options I have found most useful for introducing students to and engaging them with the international relations discipline. In general, when the models and simulations I discuss here have an essay assignment included with them, I always make it a short one of no more than five pages. As Erikson and McMillan (2014) argue, IR students need more practice condensing their thoughts and immediately focusing on the most important elements of their argument. The overview of options presented here will begin in the next blog post with an examination of two board game possibilities, followed by two computer games , two options from popular books and films, and finally some concluding thoughts.

David Romano
Missouri State University

 

References

Brock, K. L. & Cameron, B. J., 1999. Enlivening Political Science Courses with Kolb’s Learning Preference Model. Political Science & Politics, 32(2), pp. 251-256.

Dorn, D. S., 1989. Simulation Games: One More Tool on the Pedagogical Shelf. Teaching Sociology, 17(1), pp. 1-18.

Endersby, J. W. & Shaw, K. B., 2009. Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections: A Simulation of Duverger’s Law. Political Science & Politics, 42(2), pp. 393-399.

Eriksson, J. & McMillan, S. L., 2014. Bravo for Brevity: Using Short Paper Assignments for International Relations Classes. International Studies Perspectives, 15(1), pp. 109-120.

Loggins, J. A., 2009. Simulating the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process in the Undergraduate Classroom. Political Science & Politics, 42(2), pp. 401-407.

Mandel, R., 1987. An Evaluation of the “Balance of Power” Simulation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(2), pp. 333-345.

Shellman, S. M., 2001. Active Learning in Comparative Politics: A Mock German Election and Coalition-Formation Simulation. Political Science & Politics, Issue 4, pp. 827-834.

 

 

Connections UK 2014 final report

(For a report on the previous day of the conference, see here.)

The final day of the Connections UK 2014 interdisciplinary wargaming conference started today with a panel on the use of seminar wargames in defence. Katherine Banko (Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre) discussed the application of a mixed methods, pretest/post-test methodology to a course of action seminar wargaming. Specifically, her case study focused on the Canadian decision to acquire new tactical armoured patrol vehicles (TAPV), and the use of a seminar wargame to explore optimal force structures and associated TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) for the proposed TAPV. Game preparation took five months, including pilot testing. Participants were asked to pretest rank-order five proposed courses of action for each scenario. COAs were also rated against the “principles and fundamentals of war” as taught in Canadian military doctrine.

After the game, post-test rankings showed a change in participant evaluations of the various COAs. There was also some difference between a first and second post-test. The subsequent discussion addressed some important technical issues, including the use and aggregation of ordinal ranking scales, possible anchoring effects caused by administration of the pretest, and an experimental design that would one to assess the effects generated by the moderator/umpire.

Next, Hans Steensma (Military Formats in Business) and Steven van Agt (PWC Netherlands) provided an example of a business wargame, Operation Fleet Street. In this, we all assumed the role of members of the Guardian Media Group, forming groups of eight or so and tasked with identifying the characteristics of the media battlefield (potential threats, allies, and other relevant characteristics). We then identified a major threat to our company, and then developing a proposed course of action. Each team’s COA was then briefed back to the full conference, and a winner chosen. Obviously we were working much more quickly than a real group would be, and we lacked the knowledge of the UK media market that actual corporate participants would likely have.

On the sidelines of this I had an interesting discussion with John Curry, Matt Caffrey, and Hans on whether this was “real” wargaming, or simply a wargame overlay applied to what was basically a BOGSAT. I’m not sure I much care what is, or is not, wargaming—what really matters is whether gaming approaches can address issues in a useful way. Indeed, I’ve used a somewhat similar format to address humanitarian policy planning, without any reference to wargaming at all. Some of the brief-backs from the session seemed quite good—so yes, it did seem quite useful.

After a break a panel addressed manual wargaming in defence. Graham Longley-Brown started it off with some initial comments on course of action wargaming, and also underscored how manual and computer wargaming could be linked (drawing upon the example of a project he had recently been involved with in Qatar). Paul Strong (DSTL) emphasized how important it was that game design must always keep the study requirements in mind. Manual games were, he suggested, were very flexible, and can be modified on the fly. His very rich presentation (far too rich to be summarized here) looked at DSTL support for strategic (POL-MIL), operational, and tactical games. Seminar games are often used, even as part of preparation for larger wargames. Thematic games focus on particular issues, such as IEDs and casualty evacuation. Experiential wargames are used where player’s response to unfolding events is of greater interest than the end-state. Wargames are also used to explore possible future trends and futures. he briefly discussed the Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM) too as a computational support for wargames.

Roy Benda (TNO) discussed wargaming of land-based operations. PSOM is used for training and education. MARVEL is a model-building and simulation system focused on system behaviours and relationships, rather than being geographically based. GO4IT is a tabletop roleplaying game used for training battalion and senior commanders about civil-military cooperation in complex environments. TACTIS is a digital tactical combat simulations. TNO also uses the commercial mid- to low-fidelty digital wargame Steel Beasts. CDEG (the Concept Development & Experimentation Game) has been used to explore IED and counter-IED measures.

After lunch attention turned to digital wargaming. Paul Pearce delivered a presentation on the evolution of analytical and experimental wargaming at DSTL. He framed this in the context of Operational Analysis, and the importance of repeatability, independence, grounding in reality, objectivity of process, uncertainty in data, and robustness of results (RIGOUR). Modern OA/OR started in WWII. Into the 1960s wargaming was still manual (with terrain models or maps), but computer assistance was introduced. Map-and-computer games were the norm by the 1980s, using discrete event simulation rather than turn-based moves. Databases became more sophisticated, allowing fuller post-game analysis. From the 1990s fully computerized games were also common, often with linked satellite simulations. Perception-based modeling and C2 issues assumed greater importance. In recent years there has been a return of 2D manual games (such as RCAT) with computer assistance, in part because of the flexibility of this format and in part because of the diverse range of challenges and contexts that the contemporary UK military faces.

Tom Mouat examined computer simulation in defence. He noted that the UK Ministry of Defence had many simulators—but relatively few real wargames. Simulators are favoured because they save money. UK military training expenditures are about £7 billion per year, of which over £2 billion spent on running costs—the area where simulations save money. He gave an overview of several systems: CAST (Command and Staff Training, using simulated troops in a simulated environment to train battlegroup command), CATT (Combined Arms Tactical Trainer), TES (Tactical Engagement System, a laser tag system for exercises). BCT, JOCAST, MTWAS, and especially VBS2 are used at other locations. Because live exercises are so expensive, it is essential that soldiers first be trained and tested on lower-cost simulations. The UK has many individual air simulators, but few that are linked (in large part because simulators are aircraft and manufacturer specific). While in theory linked simulators can be used for wargames, generally simulators are used more for scenario role-play. The situation is similar with maritime simulation, although simulators are more flexible and Royal Navy officers has a better sense of how to get the most out of their simulations.

In discussion, one participant noted that the increasing sophistication of mapping and imagery meant that truly immersive training required more sophisticated data presentation. This raised the question of the cost effectiveness of imagery and data immersion for training purposes. In turn, this led to a broader discussion over how much training could occur in synthetic contexts, and the extent to which this could truly replace real-world training and exercises.

Next, the conference divided into four break-out groups on the future direction of wargaming. These addressed:

• balancing simplicity and accurate simulation
• preserving and passing on design expertise
• increasing the educational use of wargaming
• involving and influencing decision-makers

With regard to the first of these topics, the group noted that complexity was not the same as accuracy, nor was simplicity necessarily the same as playability. Starting with simple games can be a useful way of encouraging players to try more complex simulations. On audience member noted that many wargamers start at the complex end of the spectrum, and only belatedly recognize the value of simple, elegant design. The second group noted that designers have both domain knowledge and game design knowledge. The former is easier to pick up. However, the ubiquity of computer and other entertainment wargaming may make it easier to develop game and game design skills to the current generation. This led to some discussion of how Connections conferences might do more to teach game design skills. The question was also raised of whether there had been much outreach to universities with strong digital game design programmes.

The third group accidentally met in two different rooms, and so there were two brief-backs. One (from the subgroup I joined) highlighted the importance of buy-in from students, who needed to see its relevance. This didn’t necessarily involve earning grades, but could also include relevance to their future careers, or even the simple social fun of participation. Instructors also had to be convinced, but the point was made that at even in the military (notably at Sandhurst) there may not be any local wargaming culture. Buy-in is also needed at a higher level. Networks of support can empower game advocates. The second sugroup highlighted the need to offset biases and stereotypes against wargaming. They also noted that gaming had weaknesses as well as strengths, and these needed to be recognized. Political dynamics, they noted, might be harder to game than purely kinetic military action.

The fourth breakout group noted that involving and influencing decision-makers required that one demonstrated the utility of wargaming as a training/education or analytical tool. It is also helpful to emphasize that wargaming has and is being used by others for similar purposes. One conference participant noted that if an interest in, and competence in, wargaming can be established at lower levels, these individuals may prove to be future senior leaders. There also a need to establish that losing at a wargame is a useful learning experience, and not a professional liability. As Phil Sabin noted, perhaps we should emphasize that the real choice may not be between “winning or losing,” but between “winning and learning” (or “you can’t really lose a wargame.”) I noted that we, as game designers and facilitators, have a responsibility to pre-orient game participants to the inevitability of mistakes and the value of learning from them. Stephen Downes-Martin thoughtfully suggested that the emotional commitment of not wanting to lose was valuable in driving a game—but that losing shouldn’t necessarily have negative career consequences. (I might also add that there may well be circumstances where a game really does reveal individual deficiencies that perhaps should have career consequences—I can certainly think of a few games which have, quite appropriately, shaken my confidence in operational colleagues.)

In his final conference comments Phil Sabin emphasized that Connections UK had highlighted the diversity of wargaming approaches and experiences. He also noted, however, that we remained a self-selected group, and that we needed to continue to promote outreach. Tom Mouat noted that a Connections UK LinkedIn group would be formed, and conference feedback elicited via an online survey. Graham Longley-Brown noted that the ability to effectively use wargames ought to be something on which military officers (and perhaps some in business too) were assessed, and that Connections should work towards promoting that long-term goal.

 

 Concluding Thoughts

Overall, this was a really excellent conference. I found both the panels and many side-discussions extremely valuable. Participants were eager to break out of professional and disciplinary silos, learning from and sharing with others. Almost everything was impeccably organized. The Connections conferences continue to serve a very useful role in facilitating the exchange of ideas and the development of professional networks.

The attendees of the conference tended to be white, male, and middle-aged. Only 8% or so of the participants at this Connections UK conference were female, which is about the same as the recent Connections conference in the US too. Part of the reason for this lack of diversity is the low proportion of women in the military and national security establishment. That has changed significantly in the diplomatic, intelligence, and aid communities and among defence social scientists during the past two decades, but more slowly in the uniformed branches. Part of the problem also has to do with the preponderance of men in the wargaming hobby.  I suspect that this gender imbalance can be daunting for neophyte female gamers, creating a self-perpetuating barrier to entry. (It also doesn’t help when a male conference participant, describing the accessibility of a particular piece of technology, deemed it so simple that “even a woman could use it…” Arghhhh! Fortunately that outdated attitude seems to be an extreme rarity.)

I’m not convinced that female (war)gamers necessarily bring different perspectives to the table, but it is clear that the field is denying itself insights, wisdom, and contributions from a very large demographic. The same could be said about others who are underrepresented. Coming from a context where typically 60% of participants in my serious games are women (and from diverse ethnic and other origins too) I’m acutely aware how unfortunate that is.

PAXsim’s own Archipelago Annie has raised the issue of women and professional gaming in the past, and we’ll continue to examine what can be done to further encourage a more representative, inclusive, and diverse professional wargaming community. It is also a topic that might be very usefully addressed at a future Connections or Connections UK wargaming conference.

Connections UK 2014 SITREP

The 2014 edition of the Connections UK interdisciplinary wargaming conference began yesterday with a half day of Wargaming 101 (an introduction to the topic for non-experts). Today the main show got underway with the opening of the conference itself. Some 111 persons registered this year, making it the third-largest Connections conference ever. Of these, almost 30% were from outside the UK:

• UK 79
• Netherlands 11
• Sweden 6
• US 5
• Canada 3
• France 2
• Germany 2
• Italy 1
• Norway 1
• Finland 1

Phil Sabin and Graham Longley-Brown started off the conference with a few comments. Graham highlighted the “fragility” of wargaming within the UK defence sector, arguing that at the moment expertise was too shallow and too dependent on key personalities. Consequently there is a need to deepen and institutionalize wargaming competency. Judging from a show of hands in the room, about one-third of those attending were from outside the UK. While a large number of those in the room were involved in the defence sector in some way (for example, through DSTL), only three or four were currently serving, uniformed members of the services.

The first panel, chaired by Major General (Retd) Andrew Sharpe, examined how the British Army uses wargaming. He agreed that wargaming in the UK military was weak. Effective wargaming, he suggested, usually involves an adaptive opponent, elements of chance and uncertainty, and repetition—although he implied that wasn’t always true of British military wargaming. He also suggested that wargaming was very useful in developing the ability to officers to provide leadership and concepts in warfare.

He also suggested that last year’s Connections UK conference had contributed to greater interest in, and momentum for, wargaming within the British military.

Maj Mark Nooney (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst) noted that Sandhurst did little or no wargaming, but had decided to bring it into the syllabus as a third way of training, to reinforce lessons taught in the classroom, challenge preconceptions, and to provide experience with Clausewitzian “friction” and an adversarial opponent. The Sandhurst Wargame will be a very simple hex-based wargame that will be linked to tactical exercises. Wargames will linked to historical analysis too. RMAS has also restarted the Sandhurst Wargaming Club, although at present it seemed as if only a small number of cadets participated in this.

Maj Marcus Myles (Directorate of Land Warfare) discussed Course of Action wargaming as part of the military planning process. He argued that this often took place amid time pressures, an unfamiliarity with the process, and an unwillingness to unpick one’s own plan. Efforts are underway to familiarize officers with a broader array of wargaming techniques, including the use of stochastic processes (including the use of dice) to represent risk and uncertainty.

Lt Col Ivor Gardiner (CO, 2 R Irish) highlighted a continuing problem of credibility. Wargaming is still viewed as immature, and officer cadets do not always take military history and war studies very seriously. Wargaming can be a very effective, immersive, experiential method, and (hobby) wargamers tend to come into the military with an innate sense of tactics, operations, and the estimate process. He argued that traditional adversarial wargaming had significant advantages over TEWT (tactical exercises without troops), CPXs (command post exercises), COA wargaming, and digital wargaming. He discussed his own use of Advanced Squad Leader to teach platoon- and company-level operations, as well as a few other games, including A Distant Plan to explore the complex operational environment in Afghanistan (“more insights into Afghanistan than all the reading material we are given”). It is good for officers to lose from time to time, in an atmosphere of competitive fun. He also argued that wargaming needs to start at Sandhurst, it needs to be simple, standardized, adaptable, and immersive.

Colin Marston (DSTL) stressed the need for UK MOD to establish a Wargaming Hub.  The Hub would act as the primary point of contact for customers within UK MOD.  It would be a one stop shop for collating, understanding and developing wargaming requirements.  The Hub would have the necessary wargaming expertise and networks (e.g. through events such as Connections) to provide both advice on how to meet the requirements and what links to draw from within UK MOD, industry and academia to deliver wargaming activities.  The existence of a Wargaming Hub would create a place to develop and maintain a corporate knowledge base, and record observations, insights and lessons from the delivery of numerous wargaming activities.  He also stressed that more was needed to be done to sustain and develop a cadre of experienced professional wargamers within UK MOD – and any advice on how to do this would be welcomed.     

In subsequent discussion there was some argument for “gamification” and peer rankings as a way of increasing participation and engagement, although others noted that it could create perverse incentives to participate.

Some of the panelists made arguments in favour of board wargames, arguing that military audiences are more open to using maps and counters than tabletop figure wargaming. One also argued that boardgames had an advantage over digital games in that rules and concepts were evident in the written rules and game system, rather than hidden is software code.

After a coffee break, the conference split into two groups. One (by invitation) explored wargaming requirements in defence. The other provided hands-on experience with a wargame. As an introduction to the latter, Phil Sabin discussed his own use of wargames, including a recent WWI game that formed part of a conference on the war. He focused on the challenge of gaming with many players. Does one use an umpired kriegsspiel model? Or simplify the games and rules so that players can play the game with minimal assistance?

This led into the simple double-blind wargame of the WWI Schlieffen Plan that we all played. I was up against Jim Wallman—the first game (as the Germans) I narrowly lost due to my failure to properly garrison Liege. On the second game my Allied forces retreated all the way back to the gates of Paris before launching a devastating counteroffensive that routed several German Army corps and left much of the enemy’s remaining forces spent and unable to hold their ground.

After lunch, Jeremy Smith (Cranfield University) chaired a panel that examined business wargaming. Arnoud Franken (Cranfield University) discussed “crossing the chasm” to regular use of wargaming. One recent study found that while 17% of major businesses might use wargaming or scenario development as an ad hoc analytical process, none use it regularly. Businesses, however, face risks, challenges, threats, opportunities, etc.—the sorts of things that militaries face too, and which wargames can be useful in exploring. Wargaming can thus be sold in the business world as a tool for risk or crisis management. In selling wargaming to business, the latter will want to know about relative cost and advantage (compared to other techniques); the compatibility of the tool with the way the business operates; how simple (or complex) is it to use; whether the tool be tried before full adoption (trialability); and finally, how observable is the technique (and how does the activity look to others)?

Sara Ulrich (Deloitte) discussed the use of wargames in business, especially by Deloitte. Such games have addressed everything from health care policy, to new product launches, pricing and market strategy, cyberattacks, the Eurozone crisis, nuclear energy safety, the introduction of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), the London 2012 Olympics, and the World Cup. In 2010 Deloitte acquired Simulstrat, KCL proof-of-concept company that applies wargames techniques to business and other analysis. I was particularly interested in the multi-sector humanitarian crisis wargame done for the Humanitarian Futures Programme at KCL. The scenario was set in a future (fictional) humanitarian crisis in the Ferghana Valley in 20135. Her very rich presentation noted, among other things, that experiential pay-offs from games often have to do with human interaction.

Hans Steensma joined the subsequent panel discussion. There was some discussion of who suffered more from hierarchical constraints (most seemed to think business could be even worse than the military). A couple of speakers mentioned the value of designing games around the potential problems or challenges that keep (businesses, managers, etc) “awake at night.” One audience member asked about the pricing of business wargaming, and whether it was within the reach of small and medium businesses. (I must admit, some of the discussion convinced me that I really need to charge a lot more as a wargame consultant/designer…)

Next, the conference participants took part in one of five breakout sessions. After an hour or so of discussion, these returned to brief back to the full group.

The first breakout group looked at the objectives and payoffs of wargaming. They identified a number of these, including anticipating impact (“what’s possible?”), clarifying resources needs, clarifying goals and objectives, examining trade-offs and opportunity costs, team-building, identifying what one doesn’t (yet) know—and having fun (as a way of increasing participant engagement). The second breakout group discussed game facilitation and umpiring. They highlighted the importance of emotional intelligence and self-awareness, the need to be seen to be unbiased (but not passive), the importance of maintaining the aim of the event (which requires sufficient domain knowledge and the possible aid of a subject matter expert, but too much expertise risks an imposition of umpire bias). The third group examined existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) versus purpose-designed wargames. Here the central point they emphasized was the need to first know what it is one wanted a game or simulation to do. They discussed the potential use of hybrid games, in which commercial games are adapted for particular professional uses. The game needs to be adaptable to, and relevant to, real-world situations. The fourth group explored the challenges of validation and verification. This highlighted the problem of players “playing the game/software” to elicit a win. The group also pointed to the importance of clarity of purpose, good quality data, and repeatable outputs. They noted the challenge presented by classified data that may not be releasable. Finally, they emphasized the importance of “fitness for purpose” and end-user credibility. Finally, the last group reported on BOGSATs versus expert opinion vs. scientific analysis vs. gaming. This group decided that all of these approaches could be useful, and that much depended on context (resources) and objectives. Planning and facilitation was very important in making best use of subject matter expertise, but one needed to be careful of the “factualness of facts” and experts who seemed excessively confident of their insight and knowledge. It was suggested that BOGSATs, rather than being a rival to gaming, might be a useful entry point for the introduction of gaming methodologies.

Overall, all groups came to the conclusion that there was little fundamental difference between military and business wargaming. There also seemed to be agreement that games needed to be designed around objectives, and that there was value in breaking out of disciplinary and organizational silos to link tools to needs and purposes.

Matt Caffrey (USAF) chaired an afternoon panel on how other militaries use wargaming. A presentation by Erik Nordstrand examined wargaming in the Swedish military for training, education, planning, and decision support. Johan Elg then provided an overview of wargames in military education and training. One such game was a board/map game on battalion mechanized operations; another was a simplified naval surface warfare digital game; a third was a digital air operations game. Students play these games (and others, such as VBS2) at the cadet, staff college, and senior staff college level. The presentations certainly left the impression of more wargaming in Swedish military education than had previously been described as being the case in the UK. Lt Col Sébastien de Preyet talked about wargaming in French military education and training. France has been using more and more wargaming and simulation tools, in part to reduce training costs. Industry-provided digital simulations are used, as well as adapted COTS software (with adaptation often involve enhancing its after action review capabilities). He noted the cultural confusion that can exist with regard to serious gaming and gaming, such that senior leaders associate “wargaming” with popular entertainment video games. Boardgames are rarely used in France and are often unfamiliar to French officers. He warned that for too many senior officers and officials, “heavy and expensive systems look serious,” and “3D looks smart” but that officers who will be planning and operating in 2D (map) environments need to be trained in that context. He mentioned the tension and biases involved in the boardgame vs digital game communities, and stressed that the two should not be bifurcated. Games, he stressed, were excellent supports for operational self-training. He also discussed Urban Operations, a boardgame he has designed to address the particular challenges of urban combat.

Matt himself talked about wargame use in the US military. Games were used to develop strategists (education and training), embedded within decision cycles (such as national strategic planning, theatre campaign planning, and Title X service-level force planning), or might be one-off games to address particular issues. Games could be deterministic or stochastic, rules-based or judgment-based, and constructive, virtual, or live. Stephen-Downes Martin (US Naval War College) addressed why we should care about how others wargame, arguing that it was a useful intelligence insight. He argued that we didn’t know enough about how some countries (such as Russia, China, North Korea, Iran) and even non-state actors wargame, and suggested some very useful ways in which we might think about how different actors game.

The final session of the day was a keynote address by COL David Schroeder (Schroeder Publishing and Wargames). He suggested that stories are powerful teaching tools, and that stories about military operations are often applicable to business—a point that he makes in his book Business in the Trenches. However, stories can only take us so far. Wargaming offers deeper insight, helping to identify strength, weakness, and best options—all in a competitive environment of pressure and limited time and information. Businesses can thus benefit from wargaming techniques in developing winning strategies. However, effective business wargaming requires instruction, mentorship, and practice. Both military and business wargamers, he suggested, needed better training, and make it a requirement for senior leadership. The core issues for many simulations include critical or bottleneck resources, fundamental cause/effect relationships, core processes, and having a clear picture of the operating environment. He examined these in the context of his Der Weltkrieg series of WWI games.

After dinner it was time for the games fair. I once again demonstrated the Humanitarian Crisis Game, ably assisted by two former McGill University students now living in London, Elizabeth Campbell and Nadimah Mohammed. The game went very well, with the players doing a very good job of providing humanitarian assistance to the earthquake-stricken population of Carana, and the government (led by Paul Strong) quick to respon to emerging political and security challenges. Everyone was a winner except for the unfortunate NGO player (Colin Marston), whose had difficulty attracting press attention and hence the necessary public support and donations for his relief programmes.

Playing the Humanitarian Crisis Game.

(For a report on the final day of the conference, see here.)

ISIL matrix game AAR

Matrix games are a type of free-form game in which each player, in turn, makes an argument about a particular course of action and the effects they expect that action would have if successful. Additional arguments for and against this are then made by other players. The success of the proposed action is then either adjudicated by the umpire, or resolved by a dice roll and a series of modifiers reflecting the arguments for and against. The next player then takes his/her action on the basis of this new situation, and the game thus continues. Game play may take place around a map and pieces/counters/units as game aids, or may be entirely abstract. Because events unfold according to a series of successful actions, arguments, and effects, it unfolds very much as a narrative of the scenario being explored.

Yesterday I had an opportunity to play a game a matrix game of the situation in northern Iraq, ably facilitated by Tom Mouat. Our ten players assumed the roles of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS, Da’ish, or the “Islamic State”), the Iraqi central government led by Prime Minister-designate Haider al-Abidi, the Sunni opposition, the Kurdish Regional Government, Iran, and the United States. In addition I played the “spirit of inshallah,” who each turn could argue for a likely action or effect that other players had not proposed.

We used a pair of dice for adjudication, with 7+ required for success, with the dice modified by +/-1 for every plausible argument or counter-argument generated by players.

Each team was provided with a one page briefing that outlined their situation and major goals. One of the innovations in the game was that each also started with an “initial condition” that affected their play. Thus the Iraqi central government suffered penalties to its dice rolls to reflect the poor performance of its military forces as well as the absence of an agreed government/cabinet; the Kurds suffered a penalty to reflect PUK-KDP political rivalries; ISIL was able to take the occasional bonus move to reflect its political momentum; and so forth.

The game was intended solely for the purposes of giving players an opportunity to experience the methodology, not for any official or policy purposes. Nevertheless it was conducted under Chatham House rules. The players included a couple of scholars of Middle East politics, a foreign ministry official, some current or former intelligence or defence analysts, and quite a few experienced wargamers—an opportunity group of friends and colleagues, but a quite skilled and well-informed one. Gameplay itself took a little over two hours. The game map and generic pieces used in the game are reproduced at left and below (click images to expand).

The ISIL (or ISIS) Crisis

The game started off with Washington contemplating airstrikes in support of Iraqi troops fighting against the self-styled “Islamic State” near Tikrit, but ultimately choosing not to go ahead with these. Throughout the US team was cautious about becoming too deeply involved in an Iraqi quagmire. Later some US Special Forces were sent to the country, and—after some extended discussions with the Iraqi government—ended up conducting cautious reconnaissance of ISIL positions. A terrorist attack struck the US Navy in the Persian Gulf (for which ISIL claimed responsibility), but this has little impact on American policy.

ISIL itself decided to launch an offensive towards Karbala through the sparsely populated areas to the northwest and west. This was intended largely as a feint and diversion, but it caught the Iraqi Army by surprise, which quickly routed. Much to everyone’s surprise, ISIL then defeated the Shiite militias in the city, causing a massive out-flow of terrified refugees.

Prime Minister Abidi oscillated between efforts to form a national unity government and building up troops for a counter-offensive. Iran sent arms, advisors, humanitarian aid. At the request of the Kurds, some Iranian combat units also entered Iraqi Kurdistan. Secretly the Kurds had cut side deals with both Iran and ISIL which enabled the Peshmerga to recapture Mosul but also saw most ISIL units leave the city to battle elsewhere.

The Iraqi Prime Minister’s effort to broaden the base of the Iraqi government bore some fruit when the Sunni opposition—attracted by the offer of future political decentralization and an equitable share of oil resources—abandoned their erstwhile jihadist allies. Heavy fighting soon followed as local Sunni tribal militias and ISIL militants fought for control of the border crossings into Syria. US airstrikes and a covert supply of US weapons to the anti-ISIL tribal fights tipped the fighting slightly towards the latter, although ISIL reinforcements continued to arrive from Syria to keep the fighting going.

At the same time, Baghdad launched two major offensives, Operation Heavenly Sword and Son of Heavenly Sword. The first bogged down amid poor planning and logistics (ie, a poor dice roll). The latter, however, eliminated most of the ISIL fighters in Karbala amid widespread destruction and atrocities on both sides.

The game ended with ISIL weaker but still a significant threat. The Sunni opposition, although now allied with the Iraqi central government, remained deeply suspicious of Baghdad. The Iranians had gained greater influence in the country, and were stalling on a Kurdish request that they withdraw their forces from Kurdistan. The US had become more deeply involved in military action, but had remained cautious, had not deployed major ground forces, and had exerted only limited influence on events.

For its part, the Iraqi government called for major talks between all parties—including, indirectly, ISIL—on national reconciliation. This received a lukewarm response from some. It also split the Shiite community, with many Iraqi militia leaders arguing that it was pointless to talk with extremists and favouring instead stepped up military action against their Sunni jihadist foes.

Methodological Impressions

Although I had watched and dabbled with matrix games a few times, this was the first one I had fully participated in and played through until the end.

• The methodology is very flexible, and games can be quickly designed and conducted. Effective game play is highly dependent on a skilled facilitator, however. (Tom, fortunately, is very good.) It also needs players who are willing to accept the lack of formal rules. As one observer noted, it probably would have helped to have had a trial turn before the proper game started.
• Like most games—and, indeed, history itself—there is a significant degree of built-in path dependency. This can be a problem if players don’t roleplay well, try to get too clever, or manage to pull off an unrealistic or implausible action early in the game (possibly through a lucky dice roll if that system of adjudication is used), thereby skewing the game in a particular direction. In our game, I didn’t think that the ISIL conquest of Karbala—a large, religiously symbolic, and very, very Shiite city—was at all realistic. I also thought that the government strategy of allowing ISIL attacks of Karbala as a way of mobilizing Shi’ite outrage was too risky to be feasible.
• Of course, an umpire can rule against actions that are thought to be too unrealistic. However, if the game is too directed it merely ends up reproducing the views and possible biases of the adjudicator. Moreover, it also risks excluding interesting “black swans” and other low probability/high impact events. After all, few if any analysts had predicted that (Sunni) Mosul would fall so easily to ISIL earlier this year.
• I think it helped to have a neutral, subject matter expert player to periodically nudge the game back to a more “realistic” course or to try to make sure that various important consequences of actions are represented in the game. It would also be useful to have a discussion and consequence management phase at the end of each turn to address what had happened and what additional second and third order effects actions might have.
• The physical layout of the game matters. In our case the map and proliferation of military unit markers may have predisposed some players to think in military rather than political terms.  On the other hand, the game did nicely illustrate the difficulty of undertaking political initiatives and reforms amid an ongoing security crisis.
• The choice of roles and players matters a lot. We had deliberately chosen tow knowledgeable (and devious) participants to play ISIL. Had others been playing the role it might have all turned out rather differently. We had also limited the number of roles to six for practical reasons. The absence of the Syrian government and various Syrian opposition groups from the game had the clear consequence of biasing us towards an Iraq-centric focus on ISIL. The absence of a Turkish player may have also given the Kurds greater free rein than in real life.
• Even where game play diverged from the most likely course of events in Iraq, it provided considerable material for discussion. Tocite just a few of the issues that arose during our two hours of play:
  • How decentralized is ISIL? How vulnerable is it to leadership casualties? Have its recent successes been part of an central campaign plan, or rather rapid exploitation of local successes by local commanders?
  • How cohesive and fanatical is ISIL? Could parts of the organization be lured away with promises of political decentralization in Iraq? (I think not, but in our game Baghdad clearly hoped to do so.)
  • How easily can ISIL mask major troop movements from allied ISR, or otherwise complicate targeting? To what extent can it support operations away from its Sunni population base?
  • What domestic constraints exist on US policy? Would an ISIL-linked act of terrorism deter greater American involvement, encourage it, or (as in the game) have little effect?

A critical question, of course, is whether two+ hours of matrix gaming provided more insight into these and other issues than would have been derived from a BOGSAT (“bunch of guys/gals sitting around a table”) of similar duration. I am not convinced that the game was better—indeed, having recently participated in an official/classified meeting on the topic, I thought the latter discussion was more productive. The game did, however, provide a different, and perhaps more enjoyable, perspective. Consequently, matrix gaming does have some value as a sort of alternative analysis exercise intended to shift analysts out of traditional and more comfortable thought processes. It can also serve to break up the monotony of a long seminar-type discussion, and encourage participants to interact and network in different ways.

Finally, the approach can easily be replicated and repeated. By doing so, more of the possible problem space be mapped. If key actions or questions repeatedly occur in games drawing upon different participants this would also suggest key questions, indicators, and potential courses of action worthy of additional analytical attention.

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For more on this approach, see Matrix Games for Modern Wargaming, a newly-published booklet by John Curry and Tim Price. We’ll be reviewing it soon here at PAXsims. You also find a much more detailed write-uo of the game at John’s History of Wargaming Project website, and a very useful set of reflections by Ben Taylor elsewhere at PAXsims.

A recent version of the ISIS Crisis materials can be found on Tom Mouat’s website.